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INTRODUCTION 
“A very rarely discussed property of data: it is toxic in large quantities—even in 
moderate quantities.”  
— Nassim Nicholas Taleb1 
 
The statistical concept of “noise” can be described, in very general terms, as 
random or nonrepresentative data, which can be confused with and obscure 
meaningful data, called “signal.”2 If, in the process of collecting more data, most of 
the data added is not meaningful, the “signal-to-noise-ratio” drops, the quality of the 
data set as a whole is reduced, and inferences made based upon it will be less 
accurate.3 The law has its own mechanisms for preventing “noise” from reaching 
finders of fact.4 Unfortunately, noise is, by definition, hard to distinguish from signal.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 . J.D. 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. B.A. 2012, University of 
Cincinnati. I wish to thank Professor Joseph Hoffmann and Hannah Clendening for their 
insightful comments on earlier drafts. I also wish to thank Alex Van Dyke for his patience and 
support as an editor, and all the members of ILJ who helped throughout the editorial process.  
 1. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 126 
(2012). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 126–27 (describing the diminishing marginal value of certain kinds of financial 
market information, such that daily updates contain more random variation than information 
about meaningful trends, and how consequently receiving this information leads to worse 
trading decisions and greater unhappiness).  
 4. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting courts to “exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
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In the decade since Scott v. Harris,5 there has been considerable academic 
commentary on—and psychological research demonstrating—the deceptive 
ambiguity of video evidence, its potential for biased perception and interpretation, 
and the need for greater scrutiny of and caution in its use.6 Dan Kahan and his 
colleagues responded to Scott by conducting a study of 1350 people, which revealed 
that a sizable minority of the sample viewers—like Justice Stevens—did not interpret 
the video as depicting so dangerous a car chase as would justify the use of deadly 
force.7 The tendency to interpret the video this way was found to be correlated with 
demographic characteristics, such as race, geographic region, and income, and with 
holding certain beliefs and values.8 Much of the research of biases affecting the 
perception or interpretation of video has studied the influence of such personal or 
dispositional traits of the viewer.9  
Much of the criticism of Scott was related to the Court’s decision to resolve the 
matter on summary judgment and to the problems of judges deciding questions of 
fact in reliance of deceptively ambiguous video.10 Considering the unseen influence 
of ideology on interpretation, it is tempting to believe that judgments of politically 
sensitive matters should be made by juries, who, hopefully representing a fair cross 
section of the community, will contain enough diversity of opinion to be insulated 
from the effects of such biases.11 If Scott had gone to a jury, and if that jury contained 
                                                                                                                 
 
evidence”). 
 5. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). Scott was a § 1983 action against a police officer who ended a 
car chase by intentionally ramming the plaintiff’s vehicle from the road, resulting in the 
plaintiff’s paralysis. Id. at 374–75. Relying on the officer’s “dash cam” video, the Court ruled 
8–1, granting summary judgment for the officer on the ground that no reasonable jury could 
find that the officer’s decision was unreasonable in light of the public danger created by the 
car chase. Id. at 386. Interpreting the video quite differently, Justice Stevens dissented, 
emphasizing facts such as the fleeing plaintiff’s use of his turn signals before changing lanes 
to pass upcoming vehicles, the absence of any pedestrians in the area, and the police officers’ 
use of their sirens to alert drivers to the approaching chase, and concluding that the public 
threat was not so serious as to warrant deadly force. Id. at 389–95.  
 6. See, e.g., Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 
1333 (2010); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You 
Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
837 (2009); Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & 
CLASS 17 (2008). 
 7. Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 864–70. 
 8. Id. at 867 (finding that of all the factors examined, race had the strongest impact on 
responses to the questions about the video and the reasonableness of Scott’s conduct, but that 
the presence of “hierarchical” versus “egalitarian” worldviews also had significant effects). 
 9. See, e.g., id. at 837; Dan M. Kahan, David Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devans, 
Eugene Lucci & Katherine Cheng, Ideology or Situation Sense: An Experimental Investigation 
of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 440 (2016); 
Roseanna Sommers, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 
1304, 1348 (2016). 
 10. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 6; David Kessler, Justices in the Jury Box: Video 
Evidence and Summary Judgment in Scott v. Harris, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423 (2008); 
Naomi Mezey, The Image Cannot Speak for Itself: Film, Summary Judgment, and Visual 
Literacy, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2013); Silbey, supra note 6. 
 11. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Donald Braman, Danieli Evans & Jeffrey J. 
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a member of the sizable minority prone to interpret the video as Justice Stevens did, 
then that jury may have hung.12  
But while many crimes implicate a juror’s ideological judgments to some degree, 
much of the post-Scott research about biases affecting the reliability of video 
evidence has focused on the intensely polarizing topic of police use of force.13 
Considering the current levels of polarization,14 it may be doubtful that any political 
solutions could be crafted to address the dispositional biases operating in such 
partisan arenas—at least for the time being. And considering our system’s traditional 
deference to the jury and its democratic functions,15 in many instances it may be 
debatable whether ideological biases are “errors” which should be corrected at all.16 
Video evidence, however, is not confined to police use of force cases; several 
states now require that custodial confessions be recorded,17 many police departments 
                                                                                                                 
 
Rachlinski, They Saw a Protest: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 893 (2012) (“Perhaps ‘from the mode of their selection, coming from 
the various classes and occupations of society, and conversant with the practical affairs of 
life,’ jurors will enjoy advantages over a single judge, whose ‘habits and course of life’ are 
necessarily peculiar, in ascertaining the truth when facts are disputed.” (quoting Maher v. 
People, 10 Mich. 212, 222 (1862))).  
 12. Whether this would always be desirable is another question. Consider the recent 
second mistrial of Ray Tensing, the University of Cincinnati police officer indicted for the 
murder of an unarmed black driver he shot during a traffic stop. Chelsea Bailey & Daniel 
Arkin, Ray Tensing: Ex-Police Officer Won’t Be Retried for Third Time in Murder Case, 
NBCNEWS (July 18, 2017, 6:32 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ray-tensing 
-ex-police-officer-won-t-be-retried-third-n784111 [https://perma.cc/XW8U-T95K]. Tensing 
claimed that he shot the driver, Samuel DuBose, after DuBose’s car started moving forward, 
causing him to be dragged along and making him fear for his safety. Id. The prosecutor argued 
that Tensing’s body camera video contradicted that claim by showing that Tensing was not 
physically dragged by the car. Id. Despite the video, two juries deadlocked, and the prosecutor 
decided not to pursue a third trial, concluding that a conviction would not be forthcoming. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 6; Kahan et al., supra note 11; Sommers, supra  
note 9.  
 14. The arrest of legislation and the numerous other problems creating and created by our 
current partisan gridlock are a popular subject of study these days. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-
Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953 (2016); Anthony J. 
Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, Hyperpolarization, and Partisan 
Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L & PUB. POL’Y 57 (2017); David Schoenbrod, 
How to Salvage Article I: The Crumbling Foundation of Our Republic, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 663 (2017). 
 15. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 904 (“Our legal system conspicuously holds 
forth jury decisionmaking as a means of making the law responsive to, and hence legitimately 
binding on, individuals of diverse backgrounds.”); Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is 
Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1417 (1997). 
 16. Cf. Govind Persad, When, and How, Should Cognitive Bias Matter to Law?, 32 LAW 
& INEQ. 31, 60 (2014) (acknowledging that some biases, like those based on racial 
discrimination, are “normatively indefensible,” but that these should be distinguished from 
other forms of bias which are not necessarily wrongful).  
 17. As of 2015, eighteen states and the District of Columbia required (either by statute or 
judicial decision) that custodial interviews be recorded, most of the law enforcement agencies 
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are equipping their officers with body-worn cameras (BWCs),18 which are more 
often used to prosecute crimes by citizens than by officers,19 and surveillance 
cameras are becoming more commonplace as well, at least in some cities.20 And 
while this evidence can have many benefits, there are also many cognitive biases 
which can undermine its reliability. Many such biases are more a function of context, 
such as camera angle21 and playback speed,22 than the disposition or values of the 
viewer.23 
                                                                                                                 
 
in another four states adopted recording policies voluntarily, and in 2014, the DOJ announced 
that the FBI, DEA, ATF, and the U.S. Marshals Services would record custodial interviews 
for federal criminal investigations. See THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, IMPLEMENTING ELECTRONIC 
RECORDING OF CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS: A PRIMER FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 2 (2015), 
https://legalteklx.com/images/Innocence%20Project-Implementing%20Electronic 
%20Recording%20of%20Custodial%20Interviews.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUL7-NQV6]. 
 18. Mike Maciag, Survey: Almost All Police Departments Plan to Use Body Cameras, 
GOVERNING.COM (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov 
-police-body-camera-survey.html [https://perma.cc/54K8-CNXG] (describing a nationwide 
survey of seventy law enforcement agencies, with “95 percent either committed to body 
cameras or having completed their implementation”); see also SHELLEY S. HYLAND, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BODY-WORN CAMERAS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2016 (2018) 
(conducting study of over fifteen thousand state and local law enforcement agencies, 44.7% 
of which had at least some BWCs in service in 2016); LINDA MEROLA, CYNTHIA LUM, 
CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER & AMBER SCHERER, CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POLICY, BODY 
WORN CAMERAS AND THE COURTS: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE PROSECUTORS (2016), 
http://cebcp.org/wp-content/technology/BWCProsecutors.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DNW 
-UQEZ] (describing a survey of 321 state prosecutors offices; almost two-thirds reported 
working with body-camera evidence). 
 19. MEROLA ET AL., supra note 18, at 5 (noting that 92.6% of prosecutors from 
jurisdictions with officers equipped with body cameras reported using the video to prosecute 
a private citizen, compared with 8.3% who had reported using it to prosecute an officer). 
 20. See, e.g., Adam Schwartz, Chicago’s Video Surveillance Cameras: A Pervasive and 
Poorly Regulated Threat to Our Privacy, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 47, 48–49 (2013) 
(describing research by the ACLU and statements from officials indicating that as of 2013, 
Chicago Police Department had a surveillance network of over 20,000 cameras). As is 
seemingly often the case with video evidence, the number of cameras recording is much easier 
to find than the amount of video evidence generated or used. See Gaynor Hall & Pam Grimes, 
Are Surveillance Cameras Making Chicago Safer?, WGNTV.COM (Feb. 22, 2016, 9:30 PM), 
https://wgntv.com/2016/02/22/are-surveillance-cameras-making-chicago-safer 
[https://perma.cc/NK7C-57R5] (noting that spokesperson from Cook County State’s 
Attorney’s office claimed they “can’t identify a precise number of cases where cameras were 
utilized, though they have been helpful in some cases”). Houston has also reportedly seen an 
uptick in security camera installations. See Terry Gross, With Closed-Circuit TV, Satellites 
and Phones, Millions of Cameras are Watching, NPR (Feb. 8, 2018, 2:27 PM), https://www 
.npr.org/2018/02/08/584243140/with-closed-circuit-tv-satellites-and-phones-millions-of 
-cameras-are-watching [https://perma.cc/JC4T-JCW3] (interviewing Robert Draper, journalist 
from National Geographic, who reported that Houston had “very quietly deployed about 900 
cameras throughout the city . . . largely because Department of Homeland Security grant 
money was available to do so”). 
 21. See infra Section I.A. 
 22. See infra Section I.E. 
 23. See Benforado, supra note 6, at 1348 (arguing that researchers of dispositional video 
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While there is a rich body of empirical research about situational biases affecting 
video evidence, until recently, much of it has been limited to highly specific domains, 
such as the effects of camera angle on viewer perceptions of confessions.24 Video 
from other sources (like surveillance cameras) are sometimes studied as well, but, 
again, often only in fairly specific contexts, such as the factors affecting the accuracy 
of identification of subject in surveillance video.25 While BWCs also receive 
considerable attention by legal scholars,26 and have been the subject of numerous 
empirical studies, most of these have centered around the psychological impact of 
the camera itself on the behavior of police or the public, rather than the perception, 
quality, or use of the evidence that body cameras produce.27  
This Note examines recent developments in the research of situational video 
evidence biases. Part I examines the current and growing body of psychological 
research into the various situational biases that can affect the reliability of video 
evidence and the gaps in this research that require further attention from researchers 
and legal academics. Because these biases do not “operate in a vacuum,”28 Part I also 
examines some of the recent and exciting research into the interaction between 
situational and dispositional biases. Part II examines the development of camera and 
video processing technology and its limitations as a means of mitigating such biases. 
Part III explains how such research could be used to develop heuristics to better 
assess the admissibility or presentation of video evidence and the need for greater 
judicial scrutiny of video evidence. This Note concludes by highlighting the potential 
research about the situational factors affecting the perception that video evidence has 
for producing insights useful for practitioners conducting criminal trials and 
                                                                                                                 
 
evidence biases should revise their methodological framework to include and account for the 
influence of situational factors). 
 24. See infra Section I.A.  
 25. Anne P. Hillstrom, Lorraine Hope & Claire Lee, Applying Psychological Science to 
the CCTV Review Process: A Review of Cognitive and Ergonomic Literature (Univ. of 




-and-ergonomic-literature.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WB4-3G3C]; see, e.g., Eugene M. Caruso, 
Zachary C. Burns & Benjamin A. Converse, Slow Motion Increases Perceived Intent, 113 
PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 9250 (2016), http://www.pnas.org/content/113/33/9250.full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/372B-KMBP]; Dawn Grant & David Williams, The Importance of 
Perceiving Social Contexts When Predicting Crime and Antisocial Behaviour in CCTV 
Images, 16 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCH. 307 (2010). 
 26. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 
50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 944 (2017); Caren Myers Morrison, Body Camera Obscura: The 
Semiotics of Police Video, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 791 (2017). 
 27. See CYNTHIA LUM, CHRISTOPHER KOPER, LINDA MEROLA, AMBER SCHERER & 
AMANDA REIOUX, CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POLICY, EXISTING AND ONGOING BODY 
WORN CAMERA RESEARCH: KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES (2015), 
http://cebcp.org/wp-content/technology/BodyWornCameraResearch.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FJH6-BDJ8] (noting that comparatively little research has been done into the 
effects of video evidence on, for example, prosecutorial decision making).  
 28. Benforado, supra note 6, at 1363. 
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municipalities and police forces adopting video technology, and closes with 
suggestions for further research. 
I. WHAT THEY SEE IS (NOT) ALL THERE IS: THE CURRENT RESEARCH OF 
SITUATIONAL VIDEO EVIDENCE BIASES  
Because some have suggested that the term “bias” is prone to misunderstanding,29 
it may be helpful to start by defining it. “Bias” may be defined as the “systematic 
variation in judgmental tendencies elicited by some attribute or property of a 
stimulus,”30 or, more simply, as “anything tending to influence one in a particular 
direction.”31  
One of the central difficulties in discussing cognitive bias is that it necessarily 
requires some normative assumptions. To say that something influences a person’s 
perceptions or judgments in a predictable way does not necessarily make this 
influence wrongful.32 The American criminal justice system does, however, embrace 
some basic normative principles—such as avoiding the conviction of the factually 
innocent,33 and avoiding arbitrary verdicts34—that are regarded as so fundamental 
that we may treat them as axiomatic.35 Therefore, this Note attempts to identify biases 
which are likely to be unjustifiable because research suggests that they can lead to 
inaccurate verdicts,36 and biases that are troubling (though not necessarily 
unjustifiable) because they suggest the influence of some process that most would 
consider random or unconnected to the proper inquiry the criminal justice system 
should perform.37  
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. Persad, supra note 16, at 34–36.  
 30. Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of 
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1035 (2006) (providing the example of “a person’s 
membership in a particular group”). 
 31. Bias, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (1981).  
 32. The criticism that normative claims about proper behavior cannot be directly inferred 
from empirical or descriptive observations is not new. See DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN 
NATURE, BOOK III: MORALS 241–42 (1740) (expressing the famous “is-ought” distinction). 
This criticism is still made in this context. See Persad, supra note 16, at 63–64 (arguing that 
“behavioral science does not and cannot show on its own that biases or heuristics are either 
desirable or objectionable”).  
 33. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that confessions 
extracted by violent coercion violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 34. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) (“Law is something more 
than mere will exerted as an act of power. It must be not a special rule for a particular person 
or a particular case, but . . . ‘[should] hear[] before it condemns . . . proceed[] upon inquiry, 
and render[] judgment only after trial’ . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
 35. Notwithstanding Professor Persad’s argument that “legal commentators should be 
clear about whether they define bias descriptively or prescriptively,” supra note 16, at 36, he 
also acknowledges that some forms of bias, such as racial or sexual discrimination, are 
“normatively indefensible,” id. at 60.  
 36. See infra Section I.A (discussing the camera perspective bias).  
 37. Persad, supra note 16, at 58, offers an excellent example of the latter type of bias, the 
“reiteration effect”—where confidence in the truth of a statement rises as the statement is 
repeated—which he argues is likely unjustifiable in the criminal context: “In most cases, it is 
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As alluded to above, the relevant psychological research of video evidence biases 
can be roughly divided into two broad categories—dispositional and situational. 
Dispositional biases are those motivated by culture, beliefs, values, and group 
commitments (conscious or unconscious) of the viewer.38 Situational biases result 
from the interaction between contextual factors and subconscious cognitive 
processes.39 These categories are not mutually exclusive, and some biases may be 
better understood as a product of both dispositional and situational factors.40  
While this Note primarily discusses situational biases, it does not begin from a 
premise that dispositional ones are unimportant. Given the pervasive disparity in the 
punishment of racial minorities,41 implicit racial biases alone have powerful impacts, 
but these problems are politically, as well as psychologically, complex.42 But while 
racial discrimination is doubtless an unjustifiable form of bias, other kinds of 
dispositional bias, such as the influence of political ideology on subjective 
determinations of reasonableness, raise more difficult philosophical questions about 
whether they are problems in need of solutions.43  
                                                                                                                 
 
very hard to see how any reasonable model of human behavior would treat the number of times 
a claim is repeated as a legitimate influence on the evaluation of the claim. As such, the 
influence of the reiteration effect on, for instance, prosecutors’ decisions about whether to 
prosecute serves to introduce a lottery element into the question of whether a given defendant 
is prosecuted. Such a lottery seems contrary to the normative aims of the justice system.” 
(internal citations omitted). See also infra Section I.B (discussing the slow-motion 
intentionality bias). 
 38. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 6; Kahan et al., supra note 11; Sommers, supra note 
9 (studying the extent to which viewers feelings about police influenced their assessments of 
the appropriateness of an incident of police use of force, and finding that video did no better 
than other presentation formats at mitigating the influence of these ideas on assessments). 
 39. A useful framework for understanding the operation of these biases is the “dual 
process” approach. “System 1” is a system of subconscious, intuitive, mental processes (often 
described as “heuristics” or mental shortcuts) that govern many human judgments and 
behavior, and which are fast and efficient compared to the slower, more deliberative processes 
of “System 2,” but which can produce predictable errors in judgment or perception when 
applied to tasks for which these intuitive processes are ill-suited. See, e.g., DANIEL 
KAHENEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 21–25 (1st ed. 2011); see also Christine Jolls & Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006) (explaining the dual-
process approach and offering it as a framework for approaching problems of implicit biases 
against members of socially disadvantaged groups).  
 40. See infra Section I.B (discussing “Racial Salience”). 
 41. See, e.g., EMILY OWENS, ERIN M. KERRISON & BERNARDO SANTOS DA SILVERIA, 
QUATTRONE CTR. FOR THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., EXAMINING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CRIMINAL 
CASE OUTCOMES AMONG INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN SAN FRANCISCO, SUMMARY REPORT 
(2017), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6792-examining-racial-disparities-may-2017-
summary [https://perma.cc/SJ2H-HMH3] (summarizing study showing that defendants of 
color were held in pretrial custody longer than whites, were convicted of more severe crimes, 
and received more severe sentences). 
 42. See generally, e.g., Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes 
of Racial Disparities in the American Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUST. 273 (2010); 
see also Ellen A. Donnelly, The Politics of Racial Disparity Reform: Racial Inequality and 
Criminal Justice Policymaking in the States, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUSTICE 1 (2016).  
 43. For example, if ideological traits correlated with conservative political leanings tend 
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Situational biases are complex as well, but some of the problems created by these 
biases may be solvable without making large systemic changes. Further, many of 
these biases are less potentially divisive than ones that are studied almost entirely in 
the context of police use of force. Many of these situational biases can be fairly 
characterized as unwanted; they affect people subconsciously in ways they would 
themselves disapprove of if they were aware of them.44 As space considerations 
would make a full taxonomy of the research of video evidence bias impractical, the 
following summary is instead designed to sketch the landscape of such research the 
potential scope of the problems they create, and the need for further attention and 
research in some areas.  
A. The Camera Perspective Bias  
An inherent limitation of video evidence is that each camera records from one, 
limited perspective,45 which affects the way the playback is perceived in various 
ways. The longest-studied of these effects, called simply the “camera perspective 
bias,” refers to the consistently demonstrated tendency of viewers to perceive 
recorded confessions as being more voluntary when the camera is focused on the 
suspect making the confession, as opposed to when the camera shows both the 
suspect and the interrogator.46 All of these studies pertain to confession videos, but 
it is worth examining this bias in detail because of the scope and impact of recorded 
confessions,47 and because the rich body of studies has revealed many findings that 
may be applicable to other kinds of criminally relevant video. 
Lassiter and colleagues have demonstrated that viewers of confession videos 
believe confessions to be the most voluntary when the camera focuses only on the 
suspect, the least voluntary when focused on the interrogator, and have intermediate 
impressions of voluntariness when viewing “equal-focus” video showing both the 
                                                                                                                 
 
to make a juror more trustful of authority figures or more prone to punish those that deviate 
from societal norms, see Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 859–63, are these biases “errors,” or 
simply the expression of community values which the jury system exists, at least in part, to 
vindicate? 
 44. G. Daniel Lassiter, Melissa J. Beers, Andrew L. Geers, Ian M. Handley, Patrick J. 
Munhall & Paul E. Weiland, Further Evidence of a Robust Point-of-View Bias in Videotaped 
Confessions, 21 CURRENT PSYCH. 265, 283 (2002) (describing the camera perspective bias as 
a form of “mental contamination”). 
 45. While some cameras can pan, tilt, and zoom, the camera still only captures whatever 
is in its field of view, which cannot be changed post hoc. See Part II for more discussion of 
camera technology and its limitations. 
 46. Since first observing this bias in 1986, see G. Daniel Lassiter & Audrey A. Irvine, 
Videotaped Confessions: The Impact of Camera Point of View on Judgments of Coercion, 16 
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 268 (1986), Lassiter and colleagues have been studying this bias for 
the past several decades. See G. Daniel Lassiter, Lezlee J. Ware, Matthew J. Lindberg & 
Jennifer J. Ratcliff, Videotaping Custodial Interrogations: Toward a Scientifically Based 
Policy, reprinted in G. DANIEL LASSITER & CHRISTIAN A. MEISSNER, POLICE INTERROGATIONS 
AND FALSE CONFESSIONS, CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
143 (2010) (briefly summarizing the (then) 25-year program of research and its results). 
 47. See THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 17, at 2 (explaining that at least eighteen 
states mandate the recording of custodial interviews, as do several federal agencies). 
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interrogator and suspect.48 The effect is also correlated with observers’ judgments 
that a suspect is guilty49 and with their evaluations of the severity of punishment the 
suspect deserves.50 
Lassiter explains that this camera perspective bias is a manifestation of “illusory 
causation,” a term which describes the tendency of people to “ascribe unwarranted 
causality to a stimulus simply because it is more noticeable or salient than other 
available stimuli.”51 In the 1970s researchers began to show that this phenomenon 
affected perceptions of causality in human interactions.52 Early researchers 
hypothesized that illusory causation was a function of memory,53 but later research 
has shown that illusory causation and the camera perspective bias “[have] more to 
do with the perceptual processing system—how people pick, up, register, or attend 
to information in the first place—than with the conceptual processing system—how 
they subsequently elaborate, interpret, or remember that information.”54 
This distinction is important because the basic cognitive level at which illusory 
causation operates may explain why the camera perspective bias is so pervasive.55 
The bias has been observed in an extremely wide variety of settings: the effect 
persists for confessions by suspects of both sexes,56 for confessions to violent and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Lassiter & Irvine, supra note 46, at 272. 
 49. See, e.g., G. Daniel Lassiter, Lezlee J. Ware, Jennifer J. Ratcliff & Clinton R. Irvin, 
Evidence of the Camera Perspective Bias in Authentic Videotaped Interrogations: 
Implications for Emerging Reform in the Criminal Justice System, 14 LEGAL & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCH. 157, 166 (2009). 
 50. See Lassiter et al., supra note 44, at 279–82 (discussing Study 4).  
 51. G. Daniel Lassiter, Andrew L. Geers, Patrick J. Munhall, Robert J. Ploutz-Snyder & 
David L. Breitenbecher, Illusory Causation: Why It Occurs, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 299, 299 (2002). 
As early as 1935 this phenomenon was shown to affect perceptions of interactions among 
physical objects. Id. (citing K. KOFFKA, PRINCIPLES OF GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY (1935) 
(describing a study in which observers in a dark room were shown a widening gap between 
two pinpoints of light, which showed that observers judged the point they were looking at to 
be the one moving, even when it was not)).  
 52. Id. (citing Shelly E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Point of View and Perceptions of 
Causality, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 439 (1975) (describing a study which showed 
that the vantage point from which observers viewed a casual conversation affected their 
perceptions of how much influence each participant had in the conversation)).  
 53. Id. at 304. (citing Susan T. Fiske, David A. Kenny & Shelley E. Taylor, Structural 
Models for the Mediation of Salience Effects on Attribution, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 
105 (1982)). 
 54. G. Daniel Lassiter, Psychological Science and Sound Public Policy: Video Recording 
of Custodial Interrogations, 65 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 768, 770 (2010) [hereinafter Lassiter, 
Sound Public Policy] (citing Lassiter et al., supra note 51; Jennifer J. Ratcliff, G. Daniel 
Lassiter, Heather C. Schmidt & Celeste J. Snyder, Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped 
Confessions: Experimental Evidence of Its Perceptual Basis, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: 
APPLIED 197 (2006); Lezlee J. Ware, G. Daniel Lassiter, Stephen M. Patterson & Michael R. 
Ransom, Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped Confessions: Evidence That Visual Attention 
Is a Mediator, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: APPLIED 192 (2008)). 
 55. Id. (describing the camera perspective bias as “extremely robust and generalizable”). 
 56. See G. Daniel Lassiter, R. David Slaw, Michael A. Briggs & Carla R. Scanlan, The 
Potential for Bias in Videotaped Confessions, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1838, 1844 (1992). 
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non-violent crimes,57 for confessions filmed in realistic trial simulations,58 for 
authentic recordings of confessions from actual criminal cases,59 and for confessions 
viewed by people from diverse backgrounds60—including people from countries 
with cultural traits varying significantly from those of Americans.61  
The perceptual origins of the bias can also explain why it has proven so difficult 
to mitigate.62 In one study, Lassiter and colleagues examined the effects of the bias 
on people who were tested for “attributional complexity,” a measurement of the 
tendency and aptitude for some kinds of complex causal reasoning.63 Despite 
research showing that people scoring high on such tests tend to perform well in many 
kinds of judgment tasks,64 these people had no immunity to the camera perspective 
bias.65 Whatever advantages the “attributionally complex” people may have had in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Id. at 1846 (finding the camera perspective bias applied to videos of mock suspects 
confessing to rape, drug trafficking, and burglary); Lassiter & Irvine, supra note 46, at 270 
(shoplifting).  
 58. G. Daniel Lassiter, Andrew L. Geers, Ian M. Handley, Paul E. Weiland & Patrick J. 
Munhall, Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions: A Simple Change in Camera 
Perspective Alters Verdicts in Simulated Trials, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 867, 869 (2002) 
(recording a confession in a reenactment of an actual criminal trial, professionally filmed in 
an actual courtroom, with practicing attorneys playing the roles of the prosecutor and defense 
attorneys, with theatrical actors playing the other principles, and with a retired judge presiding 
and reading different sets of jury instructions to different study participants).  
 59. See Lassiter et al., supra note 44. 
 60. See id. (showing the trial simulation confession video to undergraduates as well as 
jury-eligible adults of different races, incomes, marital statuses, and population centers of 
various sizes).  
 61. See Kwangbai Park & Jimin Pyo, An Explanation for Camera Perspective Bias in 
Voluntariness Judgment for Video-Recorded Confession: Suggestion of Cognitive Frame, 36 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 184, 186 (2012) (finding, inter alia, the camera perspective bias affected 
perceptions of confessions viewed by South Korean subjects, despite South Korea “often 
[being] considered . . . one of the most collectivistic culture[s]”); see also Sara Landström, 
Emma Roos Af Hjelmsäter & Pär Anders Granhag, The Camera Perspective Bias: A Case 
Study, 4 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCH. & OFFENDER PROFILING 199 (2007) (observing the bias in a 
study performed in Sweden).  
 62. See Lassiter, Sound Public Policy, supra note 54, at 770. 
 63. G. Daniel Lassiter, Patrick J. Munhall, Ian P. Berger, Paul E. Weiland, Ian M. Handley 
& Andrew L. Geers, Attributional Complexity and the Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped 
Confessions, 27 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 27, 29 (2005).  
 64. Id. (noting that people scoring high on the “attributional complexity scale” were 
shown to gather and spend more time considering diagnostically relevant information when 
making complex causal inferences, and were shown to perform better on many kinds of 
judgment tasks, but noting that such people were also found to be more prone to the 
“correspondence bias,” or the tendency to overattribute human behavior to internal 
(dispositional) causes). 
 65. See id. at 33. Interestingly, people scoring high in the attributional complexity test 
were somewhat more likely overall to find the confessions voluntary and the suspects guilty, 
which was ascribed to their demonstrated tendency to view people’s behavior as arising more 
from internal causes. See id. Despite this, people with high and low attributional complexity 
were influenced by camera perspective to a similar degree. Id. at 31. Thus, while dispositional 
factors can certainly influence people’s interpretations of confession videos at the same time, 
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higher order reasoning did not help; the error, it seems, is one of perception, not 
reason.66 
Lassiter and colleagues later found that experienced judges and professional 
investigators were likewise without immunity to the camera perspective bias.67 Other 
measures, like allowing viewers to deliberate collectively before rendering 
judgments,68 have also proven largely ineffective at mitigating the bias, as has 
reminding viewers of the serious consequences of their decisions and increasing their 
felt sense of responsibility.69 The most effective method found for mitigating the bias 
is “equal-focus” recording, or recording confessions from an angle showing both the 
investigator and suspect in a single frame.70  
While there is some evidence that law enforcement agencies are starting to adopt 
equal-focus recording policies for confessions, much is still unknown about how 
many jurisdictions are still using suspect-focus recording.71 While maintaining that 
equal-focus video would be preferable, researchers, recognizing the potential 
demand for an alternative, again examined the efficacy of jury instructions.72 While 
                                                                                                                 
 
the camera perspective bias itself appears to be largely independent of disposition.  
 66. See id. at 33 (“[I]t appears that attributionally complex and simple people initially 
registered information from the observed interaction in a similar fashion; it was at this stage 
of processing that the biasing effects of camera perspective took root. Even though 
attributionally complex and simple people likely differed in terms of the thoroughness and 
sophistication with which they subsequently reflected on the information extracted, the 
damage was already done and could not easily be remedied.”); see also Lassiter et al., supra 
note 56, at 1846–47 (finding that individuals with high “need for cognition” or tendency to 
process information carefully and thoroughly, were similarly influenced by camera 
perspective).  
 67. See G. Daniel Lassiter, Shari Seidman Diamond, Heather C. Schmidt & Jennifer K. 
Elek, Evaluating Videotaped Confessions: Expertise Provides No Defense Against the 
Camera-Perspective-Effect, 18 PSYCH. SCI. 224, 225 (2007). 
 68. Lassiter et al., supra note 44, at 271–75 (discussing Study 1). 
 69. See G. Daniel Lassiter, Patrick J. Munhall, Andrew L. Geers, Paul E. Weiland & Ian 
M. Handley, Accountability and the Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped Confessions, 1 
ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 53 (2001). 
 70. Celeste J. Snyder, G. Daniel Lassiter, Matthew J. Lindberg & Shannon K. Pinegar, 
Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions: Does a Dual-Camera Approach Yield Unbiased 
and Accurate Evaluations?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 451, 451 (2009) [hereinafter Snyder et al., 
Dual-Camera Approach]. 
 71. See THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 17, at 2–6 (conducting a survey of 111 law 
enforcement agencies in Massachusetts and Wisconsin; seventy percent of respondents 
reporting either using equal-focus recording or recording with multiple cameras to capture 
both the interrogator and the suspect). The number of agencies using the equal-focus (rather 
than multi-camera) setup was not reported, and of the agencies using the multi-camera setup, 
it is unclear how often only the video from the suspect-focus camera was used in court. Further, 
the survey only covered agencies in two of the eighteen states (as of 2015) mandating 
recording, and less than a quarter of the law enforcement agencies in each of those states. See 
id. at 2–3.  
 72. See Jennifer K. Elek, Lezlee J. Ware & Jennifer J. Ratcliff, Knowing When the 
Camera Lies: Judicial Instructions Mitigate the Camera Perspective Bias, 17 LEGAL & CRIM. 
PSYCH. 123, 124–25 (2010) (noting that earlier research had mostly shown verbal instructions 
ineffective at mitigating the camera perspective bias, except ones that situationally distracted 
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providing preventative instructions with more information about the “direction and 
magnitude” of the effect to jurors before they viewed suspect-focus video73 did 
mitigate the effects of the bias somewhat better than instructions in previous 
studies,74 the researchers acknowledge that more study is needed before these 
instructions should be used in court.75 As mentioned at the outset, bias is not 
inherently problematic.76 Some could argue that a juror is more likely to find a 
suspect’s confession genuine and voluntary when looking directly at them because 
their confessions, are, in fact, genuine and voluntary.77 Unfortunately, more recent 
studies have suggested that camera perspective also influences the observer’s ability 
to differentiate accurate from false confessions.78 In one such study, confessions 
independently known to be genuine or false79 were exhibited in various formats, with 
the formats showing more of the suspect’s face or body producing the least accurate 
assessments of whether the confession was genuine.80 In accord with research 
showing the inability of people to accurately detect deception from body language 
                                                                                                                 
 
people from attending to the visual details of the video, which they recognized were unlikely 
to be popular with courts, since they amount to instructions to pay less attention).  
 73. Id. at 125–26. The instructions were modeled on other research in jury instructions 
showing that such directions must explain both the intensity of the bias and how it affects 
people in order to work, and must occur before jurors see the video, because instructions 
afterward cannot correct for initial biased perception. Id. (describing the “flexible correction 
model” of bias correction).  
 74. Id. at 130–31. 
 75. Id. (noting that further research is needed to better understand the causal mechanism 
of how the instruction mitigated the bias and whether their results would generalize to 
confessions obtained through different interrogation tactics). The jury instruction used could 
face resistance by practitioners as well; despite findings that the jury instruction only had 
significant effects on judgments of guilt for jurors watching false confession videos, see id. at 
130, some might still object to the language of the jury instruction as suggestive of 
manipulation or bad faith by the interrogator, see id. at 135 (“[B]ecause people are unable to 
see the actions of the detective that the suspect is reacting to[,] they . . . perceive the suspect 
as being more responsible for the situation and the information exchanged. . . . [W]e ask that 
while viewing the video, you keep in mind that the suspect is reacting to the detective.”). 
 76. See supra notes 29–37 and accompanying text. Lassiter is also careful to acknowledge 
this point. Lassiter, Sound Public Policy, supra note 54, at 770 (“[I]t is important to note that 
the presence of a bias in judgment does not necessarily impugn the accuracy of that 
judgment.”).  
 77. Lassiter, Sound Public Policy, supra note 54, at 771. 
 78. See Snyder et al., supra note 70. 
 79. In Experiment 2, the researchers obtained false confessions in laboratory settings by 
tricking some participants into falsely confessing to crashing a computer by mistake in order 
to protect (they thought) the professional reputations of people planted there by the 
experimenters. Id. at 460. But see infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing 
criticisms of this method).  
 80. The most accurate judgments were associated with the interrogator-only format, 
followed by audio-only (producing similar judgments to the written-transcript and equal-focus 
formats), and then a considerable decline in accuracy for versions showing only the suspect’s 
face, and, worst of all, the standard suspect-focus format (showing the suspect’s body and 
face). Snyder et al., supra note 70, at 462 tbl.2. 
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and facial expressions,81 the researchers reasoned that the formats making more of 
this often misleading information available “lead observers astray.”82 
Recognizing that many members of law enforcement may be resistant to equal-
focus camera policies because they preclude a direct view of the suspect’s face, 
Lassiter and colleagues also experimented with a dual-camera approach.83 
Attempting to avoid placing visual salience on the suspect while retaining access to 
a direct view of the suspect’s face, they used footage from two cameras, one focusing 
directly on the interrogator and another directly on the suspect, to create a composite 
video displaying both views side by side.84 While the dual-camera view did largely 
eliminate the traditional camera perspective bias (i.e., heightened perceptions of 
voluntariness and guilt when confessing defendants are more salient)85 a subsequent 
test revealed that the dual-camera method produced among the least accurate 
judgments of whether the suspect was guilty.86 It seems that the accuracy problems 
created by suspect-focus video are rooted more in the content of the video (access to 
direct views of the suspect’s face) rather than salience or illusory causation. 
While these studies provide evidence that formats showing more of the suspect’s 
face reduces the accuracy of viewer judgments, more study of this phenomenon 
might still be necessary to convince some policymakers to act. For instance, the false 
confessions used in the accuracy study from 200987 were obtained (or created) via a 
method88 that has received criticism as not eliciting a knowingly false confession.89 
Others have suggested that laboratory-generated confessions may not be 
representative of real-world confessions for other reasons.90 Video from authentic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 217, 225 (2006) (performing a meta-analysis of 206 
separate lie-detection studies, finding, inter alia, that people are less accurate in judging lies 
presented in a visual format as opposed to audio or written formats). 
 82. Snyder et al., Dual-Camera Approach, supra note 70, at 463. Viewers of suspect-
focus videos have also been shown more likely to miss legally salient facts. See Lassiter, Sound 
Public Policy, supra note 54, at 771 (describing another study in which observers of suspect-
focus confessions were worse in detecting that the interrogator directly threatened the suspect).  
 83. Snyder et al., Dual-Camera Approach, supra note 70, at 456. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 459 (Experiment 1). 
 86. Only suspect-focus video was worse than the dual-camera view in terms of accuracy. 
Id. at 462. The only formats found to improve accuracy over suspect-focus video were equal-
focus video and formats that do not show the suspect at all. Id. at 462 tbl.2. The most accurate 
judgements were produced by audio only, written transcript, and video showing only the 
interrogator. Id. 
 87. Id. at 460 (Experiment 2).  
 88. See supra note 79 (describing method for generating false confessions used in 
Experiment 2).  
 89. See Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: 
After Fifty Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 1157, 1184 (2017) (summarizing findings suggesting that some forms of such a 
“computer crash paradigm” may only cause participants to confess because they actually 
believe, correctly or not, that they are guilty).  
 90. See, e.g., Aldert Vrij, Samantha Mann, Emma Robbins & Mark Robinson, Police 
Officers Ability to Detect Deception in High Stakes Situations and in Repeated Lie Detection 
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confessions independently known to have been false may be difficult to come by,91 
and it may be still more difficult to find such videos shot from the multiple angles 
necessary for a direct study of the camera perspective bias.92 Perhaps cases of 
exoneration by DNA evidence93 will provide researchers with the materials to more 
conclusively show that camera perspective contributes to inaccurate assessments of 
whether confessions are genuine. For now, even if the evidence that camera 
perspective affects the accuracy of verdicts is not conclusive, it should be strong 
enough to raise serious questions about the wisdom of suspect-focus camera policies.  
B. Racial Salience & Other Effects of Selective Attention 
While equal-focus camera policies were found to be the most effective solution 
to the biases shown in the previous section, some newer research has suggested that 
equal-focus video may create problems of its own. A study in 2010 found that white 
viewers shown equal-focus video of confessions were more likely to judge 
confessions made by racial minorities as voluntary.94 However, viewers were also 
given tests designed to identify implicit biases against minorities, and researchers 
found that racial attitudes could not explain viewers prejudicial judgments against 
minority suspects alone.95 More interestingly, a follow-up study found that the white 
                                                                                                                 
 
Tests, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 741, 742–43 (2006) (noting that for university 
students making false confessions in laboratory settings, the stakes for being believed (or not) 
are lower than for suspects, confessing to crimes, and that students possess different 
characteristics (e.g., higher average intelligence) than criminal suspects). 
 91. For example, one study described above used video created in a simulation based on 
the transcripts from the later recanted confession of Bradley Page, who was convicted of 
murdering his girlfriend. Snyder et al., Dual-Camera Approach, supra note 70, at 457 
(Experiment 1). But even if the researchers had had actual video of Page’s confession, it is not 
entirely certain that Page’s confession was false. While several psychological and legal 
researchers believe that Page’s confession was coerced, id., others have expressed doubt that 
Page was factually innocent, see Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An 
Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 560–64 (1999). As the study in question was testing the influence of 
presentation format on relative judgments of how voluntary the confession was (and not the 
objective accuracy of these judgments), see Snyder et al., Dual-Camera Approach, supra note 
70, at 459, whether Page’s confession was actually false was not directly relevant in this study. 
But this does illustrate the problem of finding “true” false confessions.  
 92. Cf. Lassiter et al., supra note 49, at 161–62 (describing difficulties in finding video of 
authentic confessions shot from enough angles to conduct a “perfect” experiment). 
 93. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in 
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 925–30 (2004) (describing a dataset of 125 
confessions shown to be “indisputably false”).  
 94. Jennifer J. Ratcliff, G. Daniel Lassiter, Victoria M. Jager, Matthew J. Lindberg, 
Jennifer K. Elek & Adam E. Hasinski, The Hidden Consequences of Racial Salience in 
Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 200, 206–08 
(2010) (Study 2). Viewers saw one of three versions of the same scripted confession (to a hit-
and-run crime), with the suspect being portrayed by a Caucasian, African American, or 
Chinese American actor. Id. In all versions the interrogator was white. Id. at 209.  
 95. Statistically controlling for racial biases found in the questionnaires, the “racial 
salience bias still emerged in judgments of voluntariness.” Id. at 209. Researchers also noted 
2019] THE NOISY “SILENT WITNESS”  1665 
 
viewers’ judgments were significantly less harsh when the suspect and interrogator 
were members of the same minority group.96  
Drawing on prior research showing that increased visual attention to suspects 
heightened the phenomenon of “illusory causation” and caused harsher judgments 
against them,97 and other research showing that minority group members tend to 
receive more visual attention by majority group observers,98 the researchers reasoned 
that this “racial salience” effect resulted more from the contrast between the suspect 
of color and the white detective (causing visual attention to be drawn to the suspect), 
rather than from racial stereotypes per se.99  
If this hypothesis is true, then this racial salience effect might be considered more 
of a situational bias than a dispositional one. Even still, this would not mean that 
dispositional factors do not also play a role in directing visual attention—in a later 
study, other researchers found that suspects who were simply believed to be members 
of minority groups also received more visual attention and harsher judgments.100 
Research from outside the confession context has shown that drawing more visual 
attention to members of perceived outgroups can also increase the degree to which 
dispositional biases against these groups affect judgment.101 
                                                                                                                 
 
that “although Caucasians were rated as more likely to commit a hit-and-run crime than were 
Chinese Americans, assessments of voluntariness and guilt were harsher for the Chinese 
American suspect than for the Caucasian suspect.” Id. 
 96. Id. at 210–12 (Study 3). This study used the same equal-focus confession video from 
Study 2 in which the suspect was Chinese American, along with an alternate version in which 
the interrogator was also Chinese American. Id at 210. Judgments against the suspect were 
harsher in the version where the detective was white. Id. at 211. 
 97. Id. at 202 (citing Ware et al., supra note 54). 
 98. Id. at 203. 
 99. Id. at 204. In addition to explaining the odd results of Study 3, the researchers further 
supported this hypothesis by giving viewers surveys designed to test the amount of visual 
attention paid to suspects, which was predictably higher when the suspect and detective were 
of different races. Id. at 210–11.  
 100. See Kerri L. Pickel, Todd C. Warner, Tarah J. Miller & Zachary T. Barnes, 
Conceptualizing Defendants as Minorities Leads Mock Jurors to Make Biased Evaluations in 
Retracted Confession Cases, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 56, 59–62 (2013) (finding that 
viewers shown the same recording of a racially ambiguous suspect paid the suspect more 
visual attention and judged the suspect more harshly when they were led to believe that the 
suspect was Arab American than if they were led to believe the suspect was white). In a follow-
up study, a similar effect was noticed where viewers were led to believe the suspect was gay. 
Id. at 62–65. 
 101. See Yael Granot, Emily Balcetis, Kristin E. Schneider & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Is Not 
Blind: Visual Attention Exaggerates Effects of Group Identification on Legal Punishment, 143 
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 2196 (2014). In one study, participants were randomly 
assigned to “blue” or “green” groups, being told the assignment was based on their similar 
responses in a “bogus personality inventory.” Id. at 2202–04. Participants watched a video of 
two people (apparently members of the blue and green groups) fighting. Id. Viewers who more 
strongly believed that members of the perceived outgroups were different from them judged 
the outgroup members in the video as deserving more severe punishment, but only among 
viewers who directed more visual attention to outgroup members (determined via eye-tracking 
technology). Id. Other studies found a similar “attention divides” effect where heightened 
visual attention to a police officer increased the influence of viewers’ attitudes about police on 
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The mediating effects of visual attention on dispositional biases is an exciting 
field of study, particularly because some research has suggested that this may enable 
courts to mitigate the effects of dispositional biases through pre-viewing instructions 
to jurors to focus visual attention “holistically” rather than on the defendant 
exclusively.102 These visual attention effects do, however, present a problem for 
addressing the camera perspective bias. If the distinctiveness (visual or conceptual) 
of minority group members draws added attention to them, then equal-focus 
recording of confessions may mostly benefit members of racial or social majority 
groups.103 More study of these effects is needed both to confirm both their scope and 
generalizability,104 and to find effective ways of countering them.105  
C. Body Camera Perspective Effects 
The camera’s limited field of view may also create some unique problems for 
BWCs. Professor Seth Stoughton, who is generally optimistic about BWCs, has 
noted some distinct problems with the technology.106 In an interactive (although 
nonscientific) poll, he took the still unusual step of exploring the interaction between 
dispositional biases and situational ambiguity created by camera perspective.107 
Stoughton maintains that BWCs generally become less useful the closer the officer 
                                                                                                                 
 
their judgments of the officer’s culpability for his use of force. Id. at 2198–2201.  
 102. Yael Granot, Emily Balcetis, Neal Feigenson, & Tom Tyler, In the Eyes of the Law: 
Perception Versus Reality in Appraisals of Video Evidence, 24 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 93, 
101 (2018) (noting pilot study wherein white viewers watched a video showing an altercation 
between a white complaining witness and a black defendant, and such “holistic” instructions 
to viewers to not focus their visual attention exclusively on the defendant reduced the degree 
of punishment the viewers thought the defendant deserved). In keeping with the research on 
the “attention divides” effect, the holistic instructions made more of a pronounced difference 
for “highly identified” white viewers who were the most likely to show implicit racial bias. Id. 
 103. Ratcliff et al., supra note 94, at 213–14. This prospect was unsettling to the 
researchers as well, who noted the already discrepant treatment that racial minorities receive 
in the criminal justice system. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. (suggesting that law enforcement agencies could combat the bias by trying to 
ensure that racial minorities were interrogated by members of the same minority group). But 
see Pickel et al., supra note 100, at 66 (noting it may be impractical to find interrogators of 
the same minority group as the suspect, particularly in smaller police departments located in 
less diverse regions). 
 106. Professor Stoughton, a former police officer, likens body cameras to tools that can 
provide valuable evidence, but that can sometimes mislead. See Bill Nemitz, Police Body 
Cameras Are Useful Tools, but They Can Distort the Truth, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Feb. 
26, 2017), http://www.pressherald.com/2017/02/26/police-body-cameras-are-useful-tools 
-but-they-can-distort-the-truth [https://perma.cc/WP2U-M997]. 
 107. Timothy Williams, James Thomas, Samuel Jacoby & Damien Cave, Police Body 
Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com 
/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/X72H 
-W8TF] (asking readers various questions about their trust of police and asking readers to 
report their interpretation of ambiguous camera videos and the reasonableness of police 
action). 
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wearing them gets to another person,108 because the close quarters can deprive the 
viewer of context, while the rapid movement of the camera creates an exaggerated 
sense of action (a phenomenon he terms “deceptive intensity”).109 Both of these 
effects are demonstrated rather neatly by one frantic, confusing, BWC video in which 
a man in a red shirt appears to be in a fist fight with the camera’s wearer.110 The next 
video, filmed at the same time from a different perspective, reveals the two men are 
salsa dancing.111  
Until recently, most of the empirical study of BWCs has been limited to the effects 
of the camera itself, rather than how the video produced by BWCs is used or 
perceived.112 In a new study, researchers examined both the influence of camera 
perspective and of dispositional factors on the perception of video showing police 
use of force.113 Two groups of participants, university students and students in 
Quebec’s Police Academy, watched one video of the same incident of lethal force 
from two different angles, filmed either from a surveillance camera or from a 
BWC.114  
While the university students were overall more inclined to say that the officer’s 
use of force was unreasonable and that the officer should be reprimanded or receive 
additional training, camera perspective did not affect the university students’ 
judgments but did produce small but significant differences in the number of police 
candidates who thought that the officer should receive additional training.115 Further, 
while camera perspective did not have a significant effect on the police candidates’ 
overall assessments of whether use of force was unreasonable,116 the police 
candidates who saw the BWC video were significantly more likely to think that the 
officer “fired too soon.”117 The researchers reasoned that the wide lens angle of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. Nemitz, supra note 106.  
 109. Williams et al., supra note 107.  
 110. Id. (“Up Close.”). Stoughton also notes that when worn on the chest, the perspective 
often makes similarly sized subjects appear larger than the officer. Nemitz, supra note 106.  
 111. Nemitz, supra note 106. For other episodes illustrating how the limited frame (or 
“fragmented perspective”) of police body and dash cameras can mislead the viewer by 
depriving them of context, see Caren Myers Morrison, Body Camera Obscura: The Semiotics 
of Police Video, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 791, 807–15 (2017).  
 112. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Rémi Boivin, Annie Gendron, Camille Faubert & Bruno Poulin, The Body-Worn 
Camera Perspective Bias, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 125 (2017). 
 114. Id. at 131–32. The police academy candidates were in the process of completing a 
fifteen-week training program. Id. The video, produced for the study, depicted the officer shoot 
a man who was making threatening gestures toward the officer with a baseball bat. Id.  
 115. Id. at 133, 135 tbl.2. 
 116. Id. at 133, 134 tbl.1. 
 117. Id. at 138 tbl.3 (showing that 18% of police candidates who saw the surveillance video 
found the officer fired too soon, as opposed to 32.4% of police candidate who saw the BWC 
video).  
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BWC may have altered perceptions of distance,118 which, due to their training,119 the 
police candidates may have been more prone to notice or consider in judging how 
appropriate the timing of the shot was.120 Researchers also suggested the possibility 
that the BMV, by offering the point of view of an officer, may have made the police 
candidates (already more prone to identify with officers) more inclined to empathize 
with the officer.121 While interesting, the results of this study are far from 
conclusive,122 and whether BWCs affect perceptions of distance (or create 
identification with officers) among jurors remains to be seen.123  
One final and interesting possibility mentioned (though not tested) by the 
researchers here was that wide-angle lenses of some BWCs may create unique 
problems in police use-of-force cases by providing a jury with more information than 
was perceptible to the officer at the time.124 However, while potentially problematic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. The researchers noted that many BWCs are equipped with “fisheye” lenses, offering 
a wide-angle view to capture more peripheral information, which can create visual distortion 
and make estimation of distances difficult. Id. at 137–39. While the researchers reasoned that 
BWC view seemed to affect perceptions of distance, they noted that it could not be determined 
whether the BWC view or the surveillance view led to more objectively correct perceptions of 
distance, only that the BWC view seemed to make the threat appear farther away. See id. 
 119. See id. at 130 (noting that “[d]istance is a crucial factor in police use of force; for 
example, officers in most countries, including Canada, are trained to use their firearm against 
an assailant armed with a knife or another ‘edged’ weapon if the subject is within a certain 
distance” (internal citation omitted)). 
 120. See id. at 137 (noting that “[w]hen viewers—such as trained police candidates—have 
the tools to analyze a situation, they might react more ‘coldly’ to images of controversial 
interventions and consider various elements before providing their opinion”). They also noted 
that informal discussion with the police candidates revealed they considered factors such as 
distance, the presence of other persons in the room to protect, and the lack of alternatives for 
the officer. Id. 
 121. Id. at 140. While filmmakers have used “point of view shots” to deliberately foster 
identification with the character, see Morrison, supra note 111, at 815–17, whether and to what 
extent BWC video has such an effect on jurors has not received empirical study. 
 122. Apart from the cause of the observed bias among police candidates being unsettled, 
the researchers could not determine the bias’s direction—that is, they could not determine 
whether “the BWC point of view [led] participants to perceive the intervention as more 
dangerous than it actually was, or [if] the surveillance point of view [led] them to perceive it 
as less dangerous.” Boivin et al., supra note 113, at 139. Further, due to technical problems, 
the police candidates were forced to watch the video in groups (unlike the undergraduates, 
who watched individually), id. at 132, which also may have affected the police candidates’ 
judgments.  
 123. Id. at 139 (noting that the university students and police candidates may not be 
representative of other groups, like members of the general population or actual experienced 
police officers).  
 124. Specifically, the researchers noted that some wide-angle lenses used in BWCs have 
fields of view “considerably larger than what is provided by the average human eye, especially 
in terms of peripheral vision.” Id. at 137 (citing Hans Strasburger, Ingo Rentschler & Martin 
Jüttner, Peripheral Vision and Pattern Recognition: A Review, 11 J. VISION 1 (2011)). They 
further noted that BWCs may present unique problems in police use of force cases, where the 
reasonableness of force is to be assessed without the use of hindsight. Id. at 139 (citing Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).  
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in police use of force cases, in other cases wider-angle lenses might, by providing 
more peripheral information, make BWC video less prone to the problem Professor 
Stoughton observed, wherein they deprive viewers of context in close quarters 
conditions.125 Considering the rapid adoption and use of BWCs, understanding the 
psychological impact of such devices sooner rather than later may enable more 
informed decisions about camera design and use.126 
D. “CSI Effects” and Inferences from the Absence of Video 
Ironically, the misperception that video evidence is perfectly objective may mean 
that it can bias a jury even when it is absent—or more specifically because it is absent 
when jurors have come to expect it. There are certainly many prosecutors who 
believe that such an effect exists and that it prejudices juries against them.127 Some 
have associated this with the so-called “CSI Effect.”128 The “CSI Effect” can actually 
refer to several concepts,129 one being the idea that media depictions of forensic 
evidence makes jurors more likely to trust this evidence and vote to convict where it 
is present.130 A related idea is that juries, coming to expect forensic evidence, will be 
biased against the prosecution when it is absent.131 
But while many surveys have shown that practitioners believe in CSI effects,132 
there is little in the way of empirical evidence confirming these effects exist,133 and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text. 
 126. The implications of such psychological factors in the design and use of camera 
technology is addressed further in Part II. 
 127. MEROLA ET AL., supra note 18 (conducting a survey of 321 lead prosecutors, “66.9% 
of respondents feared that jurors might come to expect [body camera] evidence and that a lack 
of footage might lead jurors to question an account given by an officer or witness”). 
 128. NANCY G. LA VIGNE, SAMANTHA S. LOWRY, ALLISON M. DWYER & JOSHUA A. 
MARKMAN, USING PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION: A 




(noting that attorneys reported that many jurors find video evidence more credible than 
eyewitness testimony, and that due to the “prevalence of public surveillance technologies in 
popular culture . . . [j]urors have come to expect advanced forensic and technological evidence 
and hold unrealistic expectations about the quality of such evidence like camera footage, a 
phenomenon known as the ‘CSI Effect’ . . . [and a]s a result, jurors may falsely conclude that 
the defendant is not guilty”). 
 129. See Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media 
and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (2009) (containing a table 
summarizing eight types of “CSI Effects,” which the authors discuss with skepticism).  
 130. Id. (calling this the “defendant’s effect”). 
 131. Id. (calling this the “strong prosecutor’s effect”). 
 132. See, e.g., Michael Johnson, The “CSI Effect”: TV Crime Dramas’ Impact on Justice, 
15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 385, 389–90 (2017) (summarizing several surveys and 
news reports). 
 133. See, e.g., Ian Hawkins & Kyle Scherr, Engaging the CSI Effect: The Influences of 
Experience-Taking, Type of Evidence, and Viewing Frequency on Juror Decision-Making, 49 
J. CRIM. JUST. 45, 45–46 (2017) (describing the research examining the influence of crime 
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there are several studies suggesting that some of these effects do not exist.134 
However, there has been some recent research supporting the existence of such an 
effect in the context of video evidence from BWCs.135 As a theoretical matter as well, 
it seems plausible that some jurors would draw negative inferences about the 
credibility of, for example, a police officer testifying about events (inculpatory to the 
accused) that allegedly occurred while their BWC was off. Indeed, some have argued 
that such inferences should be made,136 and several states that mandate recording of 
custodial confessions have adopted presumptions against the admission of testimony 
about unrecorded confessions.137  
 While a presumption against the credibility of testimony about unrecorded 
police encounters may be justifiable in some instances, it may also unfairly prejudice 
the prosecution’s case. The assumption that an officer equipped with a BWC acted 
in bad faith because there is no video may be unwarranted considering all the good 
faith reasons why an officer might not record a particular encounter.138 Regardless, 
                                                                                                                 
 
dramas on juror decision-making as “in its infancy”). 
 134. See, e.g., Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429 (2006); Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim & 
Gregg Barak, A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: 
Does the “CSI Effect” Exist, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331 (2006); Tom R. Tyler, Viewing 
CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1050 (2006). 
 135. Weston J. Morrow, Charles M. Katz & David E. Choate, Assessing the Impact of 
Police Body-Worn Cameras on Arresting, Prosecuting, and Convicting Suspects of Intimate 
Partner Violence, 19 POLICE Q. 303, 309–10 (2016) (comparing data from two similar areas 
within the same precinct in Phoenix, Arizona, for fifteen-month periods before and after one 
area’s police officers were equipped with BWCs). The researchers found that “arrests, charges 
filed, cases furthered, and guilty at trial verdicts decreased substantially among posttest non-
camera cases,” where video was unavailable, “when compared with pretest cases and posttest 
camera cases”. Id. at 318. 
 136. Indeed, some have advocated for such inferences. See Mary D. Fan, Justice 
Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 944 (2017) 
(advocating that, in jurisdictions where recording is required, judges inquire into the reasons 
for gaps in BWC video, noting that drawing adverse inferences from omissions is common in 
other areas of the law and arguing that such judicial inquiry would deter selective recording); 
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MASS. & UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY LAW SAMUELSON LAW, 
TECH. & PUB. POLICY CLINIC, NO TAPE, NO TESTIMONY: HOW COURTS CAN ENSURE THE 
RESPONSIBLE USE OF BODY CAMERAS 13–14 (2016) [hereinafter NO TAPE, NO TESTIMONY], 
https://www.aclum.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ACLU_BodyCameras 
_11.21_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T26-9GWP]. 
 137. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3:17, https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/attorneys/assets/rules/r3-
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY85-TC7Y] (requiring, subject to several exceptions, that custodial 
confessions for most serious felonies be recorded; making failure to record a factor for 
consideration by the court in admitting the unrecorded statement and by the jury in weighing 
whether the statement occurred; and providing that the jury must receive a cautionary 
instruction upon request by the accused); see also NO TAPE, NO TESTIMONY, supra note 136, 
at 12 (describing similar exclusionary rules or rules requiring jury instructions in seven other 
states). 
 138. See Karson Kampfe, Police-Worn Body Cameras: Balancing Privacy and 
Accountability Through State and Police Department Action, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1154, 1176–77 
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however justified the skepticism of other “CSI Effects” may be, BWCs (and possibly 
unrecorded confessions) may represent a special case.139  
E. Slow Motion 
Film scholars have understood for years the power of video to persuade and its 
potential to mislead.140 In particular, the technique of slow motion has been noted for 
its power to manipulate the viewer’s perceptions, making objects appear lighter, 
footfalls appear softer, and physical blows appear more gentle.141 The power of video 
to distort perceptions of reality, combined with video’s perceived objectivity, can 
make it dangerous when the stakes are raised.142  
A recent series of studies showed the potential of slow motion to influence 
criminal juries.143 In 2013, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the death 
sentence of Lewis Jordan, who was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting a 
police officer who interrupted his robbery of a Dunkin’ Donuts.144 Jordan, who fired 
the shot around two seconds after the officer approached the business’s door, claimed 
the shooting was a “reflexive ‘panicky reaction,’” and argued on appeal that allowing 
the jury to view the surveillance tape of the shooting in slow motion was an abuse of 
                                                                                                                 
 
(2015) (noting that having a BWC on may sometimes be harmful to police-community 
relations and may deter victims or witnesses from making statements). BWCs can also raise a 
host of privacy concerns for suspects and the public generally, which prompted the ACLU to 
revise its position and advocate for police having at least some discretion in recording. Id. at 
1175–77; see also JAY STANLEY, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN 
PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL (2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/police_body 
-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/G379-FXL9].  
 139. Unlike the general expectation that video evidence would probably exist if a crime 
had happened because cameras are prevalent, or the general distrust of witness testimony 
because forensics are thought to be more reliable, where the witness testifying about 
unrecorded events had the ability (or legal obligation) to record but did not, there is a special 
risk that jurors will infer that the witness is not only unreliable but acted in bad faith. 
 140. See, e.g., Jessica Silbey, Videotaped Confessions and the Genre of Documentary, 16 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 789, 804 (2006) (“Film is particularly dangerous 
as a legal tool, I would argue, because of its perceived veracity and its illusion of revelation.”). 
 141. Sheena Rogers, Truth, Lies, and Meaning in Slow Motion Images, in 
PSYCHOCINEMATICS: EXPLORING COGNITION AT THE MOVIES 149, 153–54 (Arthur P. 
Shimamura ed., 2013). Rogers, in addition to noting examples of these effects in popular 
Hollywood films, also performed a series of experiments filming a number of actions, such as 
a boxer punching a bag, in slow motion, and noting that observer’s perceptions of the amount 
of force used decreased in direct relation to the playback speed. Id. at 156–57. 
 142. Id. at 154 (analyzing use of slow motion by defense attorneys for the police officers 
on trial for the Rodney King beating; the attorneys removed the sound and used slow motion 
and freeze-frames to stretch perceptions of the amount of time that had passed between King 
being tasered and his “erratic behavior” and helped to “illustrate a narrative in which the police 
perceived King as a PCP-crazed threat who fully controlled his own beating”). For additional 
analysis of the Rodney King video and several other popular episodes of police brutality, see 
Morrison, supra note 111. 
 143. Eugene M. Caruso, Zachary C. Burns & Benjamin A. Converse, Slow Motion 
Increases Perceived Intent, 113 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 9250 (2016).  
 144. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 65 A.3d 318, 321 (Pa. 2013). 
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discretion because it “made the relevant time period appear longer than it actually 
was, and thereby ‘create[d] a false impression’ . . . [of] deliberation, premeditation, 
and specific intent.”145  
While the court was unconvinced that the slow-motion playback was prejudicial 
enough to warrant reversal,146 the case did attract the attention of researchers, who 
found evidence that slow-motion video does indeed increase a viewer’s perceptions 
of intent.147 In one study, several hundred participants were shown five seconds of 
surveillance video from a similar shooting at a convenience store, both at regular 
speed and in slow motion.148 The “jurors” who saw the slow-motion video were 
significantly more likely to have perceived the shooting as being done with intent to 
kill149 and with “willful deliberate and premeditated intent to kill.”150  
In a system which requires unanimous jury verdicts, differences in perception like 
this can have serious consequences. Using the data collected, the researchers 
performed statistical simulations of 1000 juries,151 concluding that 150 of the 
simulated juries would have unanimously voted to convict after seeing the slow-
motion video, while only thirty-nine juries would have voted to convict after seeing 
the video at regular speed.152 Of course, this study did not account for the potentially 
moderating effects of jury deliberation.153 However, given that the researchers also 
found that drawing attention to the amount of time that had actually passed did very 
little to mitigate slow motion’s effects on how much time viewers felt had passed 
(and their judgments of intent),154 it is possible that little could be said during 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. Id. at 328 (alterations in original). 
 146. Id. at 330–31 (finding no abuse of discretion, noting that the jury was “well aware” 
of how much time had passed, and that state precedent was clear that specific intent to kill 
could be formed in less than a second).  
 147. Caruso et al., supra note 143, at 9250. 
 148. The slow-motion playback was made by showing the video 2.25 times slower than 
normal speed, which was approximately the speed the jury was shown the video in Jordan. Id. 
at 9251 (citing Jordan, 65 A.3d at 330 n.3). 
 149. 77.3% vs. 86.2%. See id. at 9251 tbl.1. 
 150. 73.81% vs. 80.36%. Id. at 9251–53.  
 151. Id. at 9254 (describing method for “jury bootstrap analysis” in which “juries” were 
created by selecting random twelve-person groups of participants from the study). 
 152. Id. at 9251. 
 153. Id. (noting, however, that using slow-motion video quadrupled the odds that jurors 
would at least begin deliberations ready to convict). Other research has suggested that 
individual jurors tend to vote in accordance with their initial views after the close of evidence, 
regardless of deliberations. See Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, 
Rasmy Seying & Jennifer Pryce, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on 
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 690–92 (2001). 
 154. In Study 3, viewers were shown normal and slow-motion video with timestamps 
indicating the actual time which had passed; one group also received verbal instructions 
emphasizing the actual passage of time, making clock time salient. Caruso et al., supra note 
143, at 9252. While making “clock time salient successfully decreased the bias in estimates of 
clock time, it did not significantly affect the difference in estimates of the time it felt like the 
shooter had . . . [and, c]ritically, subjective perceptions of time, not estimated clock time, drove 
judgments of intent.” Id. 
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deliberations that would change the juror’s subjective perceptions of the amount of 
time that had passed.  
Unlike the camera perspective bias, the slow-motion bias has not been directly 
shown to affect accuracy; the researchers acknowledge that while slow motion 
increased people’s perceptions of intent, these perceptions were not necessarily 
wrong.155 But this effect is troubling—unless slow motion reveals specific facts 
probative of intent, it is hard to imagine what rational connection playback speed 
would have to whether or not a video’s subject acted with intent or how such a 
“lottery” would make such judgments more accurate.156 There may, of course, be 
instances in which some legally significant fact can only be readily perceived in slow 
motion,157 but some arguments for the necessity of slow-motion video are more 
tenuous than others.158 Other times slow motion may actually obscure relevant or 
exculpatory facts.159  
On a somewhat more optimistic note, Caruso and colleagues did find that the 
slow-motion intentionality bias could be partially mitigated by showing people both 
the slow-motion and regular-speed versions of the video.160 Although, Caruso and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. Id. at 9253. 
 156. Cf. Persad, supra note 16 (offering the “reiteration effect” as an example of such a 
“lottery”). Slow motion could in fact be worse than a lottery—given slow motion’s predictable 
influence on judgment, it can potentially be exploited by one litigant or another seeking an 
upper hand. See supra note 142 (discussing the use of slow motion in the Rodney King trial). 
On balance, though, slow motion may often favor the prosecution more than the defense; 
where the video records the accused (as in Jordan) rather than the victim (as in the Rodney 
King video), perceptions of intent are generally inculpatory. The accused who opposes slow 
motion may also be at a strategic disadvantage; as the defense disputing the events captured 
(or not captured) in the video can give the prosecution an argument that slow-motion replay 
should be allowed for rebuttal. See Commonwealth v. Levengood, No. 1365 MDA 2017, 2018 
WL 1599803, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2018) (holding that trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing slow-motion replay where defendant on trial for assault raised the issue 
of self-defense and where there was conflicting testimony about whether complaining witness 
“took a swing” at defendant or was only swatting aside the flashlight defendant was pointing 
in his face); cf. United States v. Plato, 629 F.3d 646, 652 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that jury’s 
request during deliberations to see slow-motion replay of surveillance video may have been 
“ironically” precipitated by defense’s argument in closing that the video did not show the 
accused speaking to the informant or participating in drug deal). 
 157. See Bailey & Arkin, supra note 12 (describing the Ray Tensing shooting, and how 
slow-motion playback of the video belied officer Tensing’s claim that he was being dragged 
by Samuel DuBose’s car, which Tensing argued justified the use of lethal force). 
 158. Compare Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1277 (Pa. 2016) (noting that the 
fact appellant fired two shots at the victim was only readily ascertainable when viewing the 
video in slow motion), with Commonwealth v. Jordan, 65 A.3d 318, 331 (Pa. 2013) (noting 
that, in the two seconds after Jordan noticed the officer, Jordan took two steps toward the 
officer before shooting him).  
 159. See Jones v. Fisher, Civil Action No. 11-6705, 2014 WL 535182, at *12 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 10, 2014) (allowing prosecutor’s use, over defense’s objection, of slow-motion playback 
to rebut the defense’s claims that the gun went off accidentally when banged on a counter; the 
defense argued that in regular speed playback, “you could see the shooter ‘jump,’” indicating 
he was as “shocked as anyone else”). 
 160. Caruso et al., supra note 143, at 9252 (finding in Study 4 that groups of people shown 
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colleagues did note that further study is needed to determine what effects the exact 
speed,161 sequence, and number of replays have on the bias.162 It also bears noting 
that as of this writing this series of studies was the only one of its kind, and that no 
other researchers have published attempts to reproduce these studies or performed 
similar studies with other videos to confirm that the effect is generalizable.  
F. Replay Effects? 
 Strangely, little empirical study has been done regarding the effects of repeated 
viewing of video evidence. Some researchers have reasoned that the “confirmation 
bias” (the tendency to seek out evidence confirming initial impressions or pre-
existing beliefs and to discount contrary evidence) may cause repeat viewings to 
entrench viewers’ biased impressions.163 Lassiter has suggested that a somewhat 
analogous phenomenon, “expectancy effects,” may affect the perception of 
confession video,164 although whether the expectation of finding evidence in accord 
with an initial evaluation of a confession video would cause subsequent viewings to 
intensify a biased initial evaluation is another question. 
Also potentially relevant is the demonstrated causal relationship between visual 
attention and the camera perspective bias. Using eye-tracking technology, 
researchers of the camera perspective bias found that viewers (of equal-focus 
confession video) prompted to visually attend to the confessing suspect ultimately 
perceived the confession as more voluntary.165 In suspect-focus confession video, 
                                                                                                                 
 
both versions of the video from the first study were less likely to find the shooter acted with 
intent than people who only saw the slow-motion video, but they were still more likely to 
convict than people who only saw it at regular speed). Performing another jury simulation, 
they found that the “odds of a unanimous first-degree murder verdict were 3.42-fold higher 
among juries who saw only the slow version, and 1.55-fold higher among juries who saw both 
versions.” Id. 
 161. The researchers noted that “at a certain point of ‘superslow motion,’ actors may 
appear to be moving at nonhumanly slow speeds and seem less likely to possess any mental 
states, including intentions.” Id. at 9253. Film scholars have also noted this surrealistic quality 
of very slow-motion video. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 141, at 154 (noting that people shown 
high frame rate footage of a golf ball in “super slow mo” often doubt its authenticity due to 
the ball’s oddly elastic deformation). 
 162. Caruso et al., supra note 143, at 9253. 
 163. E.g., Roseanna Sommers, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization, 125 
YALE L.J. 1304, 1348 (2016) (reasoning that if certain dispositional biases are a function of 
biased memory recall, then repeat viewings could be a corrective, but noting also that the 
confirmation bias may not only prevent subsequent viewings from correcting the bias, but may 
in fact exacerbate it).  
 164. See Lassiter, Sound Public Policy, supra note 54, at 773 (describing research showing 
that viewers’ expectations influence their evaluations of human behavior in videos containing 
inconclusive evidence and that confession videos are likely to be less than conclusive). For 
more information on expectancy effects, see generally G. Daniel Lassiter, Matthew J. 
Lindberg, Jennifer J. Ratcliff, Lezlee J. Ware & Andrew L. Geers, Top-Down Influences on 
Perception of Ongoing Behavior, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF VISUAL PERCEPTION 225, 237 
(2010). 
 165. See Ware et al., supra note 54, at 197.  
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more visual attention is naturally paid to the suspect (and the bias is generally more 
intense),166 but whether multiple viewings of the same suspect-focus confession 
video would continue to amplify the bias or whether the effects of increased visual 
attention plateau after the first viewing remains to be studied.167  
It is also possible that multiple or extended viewings of slow-motion video may 
compound the effects of the intentionality bias or offset the mitigating influence of 
full-speed playback. A recent study in the United Kingdom revealed that viewing 
videos of human movements (such as running and walking) in slow motion for thirty 
seconds caused participants to perceive subsequently viewed video clips played at 
regular speed as unnaturally fast, such that the videos had to be slowed down again 
to appear normal.168 The researchers attributed this effect to a process of continuous 
adaptation to visual stimuli.169 If viewers’ perceptions adjust such that slow motion 
appears normal to them after extended viewing, then it is possible that viewers’ 
perceptions of the amount of time that subjects in video had to act and their 
evaluations of how intentional the subject’s actions were would also intensify with 
repeat viewings.  
Conversely, some have suggested that repeat viewing may sometimes be 
necessary to correct an initially biased impression. Lassiter once did a study of 
“judgment perseverance”—the tendency for people to maintain their initial 
judgments, even after the evidence on which they were based was later 
discredited170—finding that, despite the “initial assumption of guilt being completely 
discredited,” viewers were still prone to vote for conviction; only when presented 
with discrediting information while also being shown the video a second time did 
their judgments change.171 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. Id. at 195–96. 
 167. As visual attention also appears to influence the intensity of some kinds of 
dispositional biases, see Granot et al., supra note 101, at 2197, 2206 (finding that increased 
visual attention on members of perceived outgroups increased the effect of social group 
commitments on judgments and led to more harsh punishment of outgroup members), the 
relationship between repeat viewings and attention may be quite important if such biases are 
to be mitigated, as the number of times and the conditions in which a jury is allowed to watch 
a video during trial and deliberations are largely within the discretion and control of a trial 
judge. See infra Part III.  
 168. George Mather, Rebecca J. Sharman & Todd Parsons, Visual Adaptation Alters the 
Apparent Speed of Real-World Actions, SCI. REP., July 27, 2017, at 1–2, https://www.nature 
.com/articles/s41598-017-06841-5 [https://perma.cc/Z57N-LACT].  
 169. Id. at 6–7 (noting that the effect was present even in videos of scrambled images, but 
was more pronounced with videos of human figures and recognizable motions, suggesting the 
perceived speed of motion is influenced by norms of what particular types of motion should 
look like). The researchers further noted that this phenomenon could partially explain why 
drivers underestimate their speed when moving from a high-speed zone to a low-speed one; 
the process of visual adaptation makes high speed seem normal. Id. at 7. 
 170. See Lassiter, Sound Public Policy, supra note 54, at 773 (reasoning, based on prior 
research, that because the prosecution presents evidence first, a juror may “encode the 
information contained in the [confession] video in a manner that is consistent with the 
prosecution’s argument that the defendant is guilty”).  
 171. Id. This study was presented at a psychological conference but remains unpublished. 
The exact methods used are unclear. See also Granot et al., supra note 102, at 101–02. 
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Ultimately, the questions of whether and when repeated viewings of video 
evidence mitigate or exacerbate video evidence biases have received little empirical 
analysis. This is unfortunate, as the question of how many times a jury should be 
allowed to watch video evidence is one of considerable practical importance for 
practitioners, as is discussed further in Part III. 
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY  
Before considering the questions of how prejudicial biases such as these are to the 
interests of justice and whether or not legislative or judicial action is necessary or 
feasible, some may wonder how many problems created by such biases will sort 
themselves out as technology improves. Unfortunately, practical or financial 
constraints may preclude many technological measures that might mitigate some of 
these biases, while technology may be ill-suited for addressing other biases at all. 
Technological improvement in the context of video evidence has generally meant 
more172 or better cameras,173 which are considered better (by their purveyors and 
users) by virtue of capturing more information (e.g., higher framerates, resolution, 
field of view).174 It is true that practical and financial constraints force law 
enforcement professionals to carefully consider camera placement and use,175 and 
that some technological advances help maximize efficiency of resources,176 but the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. See supra note 20 (noting the increased number of cameras in Chicago’s surveillance 
network).  
 173. Some advances are technically developments of software rather than of cameras 
themselves. See infra note 176.  
 174. See, e.g., Why You Shouldn’t Purchase the Newest Surveillance Cameras—Yet, J & 
M SECURITY SOLUTIONS (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.jandmsecuritysolutions.com/problems 
-newest-surveillance-cameras [https://perma.cc/Z2WU-JGT2] (briefly explaining the 
development of surveillance camera technology, such as improvements in resolution and field 
of view, and some drawbacks, such as the increased file size of high-resolution video and 
associated storage costs); see also LA VIGNE ET AL., Public Surveillance Systems, supra note 
128, at 19–20 (explaining that automated or remotely controlled “pan, tilt, zoom” (PTZ) 
cameras can rotate and zoom to allow recording from more angles). 
 175. See LA VIGNE ET AL., Public Surveillance Systems, supra note 128, at 31–33 
(explaining strategies for placing cameras in places most likely to capture crimes). Because 
video recorded at higher resolutions takes up more digital space, law enforcement also must 
balance image quality against storage costs, both for closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems, 
id. at 54, and for BWCs, see Jason Kotowski, Money, Storage Primary Obstacles in Police 
Body Camera Implementation, Public Safety & Homeland Security, EMERGENCY MGMT. (Mar. 
8, 2016), http://www.govtech.com/em/safety/Police-Body-Cam-Installation.html [https:// 
perma.cc/CU6D-VX74] (noting that digital storage is a large part of the operating cost of 
BWCs and that this cost informs decisions about the resolution used for recording). 
Developments in compression may reduce operating costs for cameras somewhat or may 
enable the capture of high-resolution images.  
 176. Many advances here involve software rather than cameras per se. For example, when 
personnel limitations preclude having a live operator watch surveillance footage in real time 
(“active surveillance”), PTZ cameras can be set to move automatically in “camera tours,” 
which can increase the chance of a camera capturing some evidence of a crime. See LA VIGNE 
ET AL., supra note 128, at 6, 19–20; see also id. at 30 (describing facial and license plate 
recognition software). Improvements in digital video compression algorithms can also enable 
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aim of such advances is still to address problems stemming from a lack of visual 
information about a suspect or a civilian encounter.177  
As such, biases resulting from a deficit (or perceived deficit) of available 
information, like the so-called “CSI Effect,”178 may well be mitigated somewhat as 
better-designed surveillance cameras provide sharper, clearer video in more cases, 
and better BWCs prevent some failures to record violent police encounters.179 
Similarly, improvements in design might address some artifacts created by BWCs, 
such as “deceptive intensity,”180 or the lack of context created by their field of view 
in up close shots.181 Although financial, practical, or legal costs may preclude some 
of these improvements in practice.182  
Psychological research of the kind in the previous Part can show us that there may 
be additional unseen costs to adding visual information.183 When the visual 
                                                                                                                 
 
more video of the same general quality to be stored in the same amount of digital space. Nat’l 
Inst. of Justice, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech. & Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Operating 
Characteristics and Functionality Descriptions of Body Worn Cameras, Exhibit in Research 
on Body-Worn Cameras and Law Enforcement, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/exhibits/Pages/body-worn-camera-operating 
-characteristics.aspx [https://perma.cc/V38K-QJ2U] (describing the H.265 compression 
standard). 
 177. See LA VIGNE ET AL., Public Surveillance Systems, supra note 128, at 5, 37, 50 (noting 
that many investigators recommend “active surveillance” over automated “camera tours” 
because touring cameras often capture only part of the crime in progress, requiring attorneys 
to “resort to circumstantial evidence . . . to piece together a story for the court,” and that low 
visibility due to poor image quality, inclement weather, and poor lighting can also “seriously 
limit the usefulness of video footage in a trial”). 
 178. See supra Section I.D. 
 179. Some have suggested BWCs should have an “automated trigger” to start recording in 
response to raised voices or certain types of movement, so as to prevent officers from turning 
off their cameras before violent encounters with civilians. See STANLEY, supra note 138, at 4. 
While suggested as a nondiscretionary measure to prevent police abuse, such a feature (with 
or without the option for officers to manually override it and switch the camera off) could 
possibly prevent accidental failures to record as well. 
 180. For example, the exaggerated sense of action created by the BWC’s shaking when the 
officer moves, see supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text, might be mitigated by some 
form of “Optical Image Stabilization.” This technology uses gyro sensors to quickly shift 
pieces of the camera lens to compensate for sudden movements. FABRIZIO LA ROSA, MARIA 
CELVISIA VIRZÌ, FILIPPO BONACCORSO & MARCO BRANCIFORTE, STMICROELECTRONICS, 
OPTICAL IMAGE STABILIZATION (OIS) 10–11 (2015), www.st.com/resource/en/white 
_paper/ois_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6PW-MGBD]. However, at present the 
technology is expensive, id. at 4, which may make such efforts cost prohibitive.  
 181. This lack of context, see supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text, might be 
mitigated somewhat by BWCs with wider-angle lenses. See Boivin et al., supra note 113, at 
137 (noting that some BWCs are marketed as having a wider field of view, capturing more 
peripheral information).  
 182. Inferences based on the absence of video might be nearly eliminated if enough 
cameras were recording in enough places at high enough resolution at all times. But resource 
constraints aside, there are serious privacy interests at stake here, and for BWCs, valid law 
enforcement interests are sometimes served by turning them off. See supra note 138. 
 183. For example, while a wide-angle lens may capture more information close up, such 
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information added contains no legally relevant facts, collecting it wastes public 
resources. But when the additional extraneous detail (“noise”)184 is indistinguishable 
from meaningful information (“signal”),185 collecting it can do more than waste 
resources—it can contaminate the evidence we give to finders of fact and raise the 
odds of errors which cannot be measured in financial terms.  
Technological measures designed only to maximize the visual information 
available may be simply ill-equipped to solve problems created by an excess of such 
information in the first place. Present research suggests that camera perspective bias 
is generally improved only by subtracting visual information, not adding it.186 
Adding a second camera and video from another angle notably failed to correct the 
demonstrated problems in accuracy presented by the camera perspective bias.187  
This is not an argument against cameras. There are some crimes that could not be 
prosecuted without them.188 Researchers of the camera perspective bias themselves 
are careful to point out that the bias should not be taken as an argument against the 
adoption of policies mandating recorded interrogations.189 Recording interrogations 
has many benefits, and it may well be that most accused are better off with a 
recording than without one, bias notwithstanding.190  
But even if existing camera technology has been a net good, this does not mean 
that adding additional cameras will always justify the costs. Research of the 
psychological mechanisms governing our perception of visual evidence warrants 
further attention by policymakers (and developers of camera technology), as it can 
help expose unnecessary costs (both financial and otherwise).191 But while it may be 
                                                                                                                 
 
“fisheye” lenses may distort perceptions of distance. Boivin et al., supra note 113, at 137, 139.  
 184. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 186. Not visual information anyway; one study did show that newer, more explicit jury 
instructions showed some positive effect, though more research is needed to explain how such 
instructions worked, and such instructions may have practical problems as well. See supra 
note 72. 
 187. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 188. See, e.g., Morrow et al., supra note 135, at 308 (noting research showing that BWCs 
have increased prosecution in cases of domestic violence).  
 189. See, e.g., Lassiter, Sound Public Policy, supra note 54, at 771 (“To avoid the camera 
perspective bias and the poorer accuracy that appears to be associated with suspect-focus 
videos, is it necessary to throw out the recording reform with the bathwater? The answer is by 
all means, no.”). 
 190. See Saul M. Kassin, Jeff Kukucka, Victoria Z. Lawson & John DeCarlo, Police 
Reports of Mock Suspect Interrogations: A Test of Accuracy and Perception, 41 LAW & 
HUMAN BEHAV. 230, 231 (2017) (summarizing many benefits of recorded interrogations for 
the accused in deterring or detecting coercive interrogation tactics, and for investigators in 
shielding them from false accusations of coercion and obviating the need for them to take 
detailed notes). 
 191. See Hillstrom et al., supra note 25, at iii, 10–12 (summarizing cognitive research 
finding that color images did not make investigators more accurate in identifying suspects’ 
faces from CCTV images, and suggesting that jurisdictions record in black and white where 
the additional storage space required for color comes at the expense of compression which 
introduces visual noise, or reduces resolution or framerate, which may reduce the accuracy of 
identifications). 
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possible to avoid creating some forms of “noisy” evidence at the source, the ultimate 
responsibility for filtering out distracting or confusing evidence still rests with the 
courts.  
III. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
Much remains unknown about the precise costs of situational video biases or what 
could be done, practically or politically, to solve them. Some of the biases addressed 
in Part I may turn out not to be problematic. For example, some “CSI Effects” may 
not exist at all, and while some research suggests that jurors make adverse inferences 
from the absence of BWC video,192 the resulting prejudice from such inferences is 
not necessarily unfair.193 By contrast, there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that the 
camera perspective bias exists,194 and there is evidence from studies that, if 
representative of real-world conditions,195 shows that the bias is unquestionably 
problematic. But even here, there is still uncertainty about whether the proposed 
solution (equal-focus video) would create problems of its own.196  
Most of the biases addressed in Part I are not sufficiently well understood to 
justify any sweeping legislative reforms. For some types of noise-prone video 
evidence, the situational factors contributing to the bias may be so complex that we 
can never dispense with fact-specific inquiry. A per se rule against slow-motion 
video, for example, would almost certainly be unjustified, as there are times when 
slow motion can reveal legally critical facts.197 But empirical research can still 
provide useful information to help courts develop better heuristics for balancing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. See Morrow et al., supra note 135, at 317–18. 
 193. See NO TAPE, NO TESTIMONY, supra note 136, at 12–13 (arguing for jury instructions 
authorizing adverse inferences against police officers where a jury finds that a failure to record 
a police-civilian encounter was unreasonable or in bad faith).  
 194. See supra Section I.A (describing the over two decades of research in multiple 
countries showing the predictable influence of camera perspective on viewer perceptions of 
confession videos). 
 195. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text (discussing some possible 
methodological limitations). 
 196. In particular, some research has suggested that “racial salience” may preclude 
suspects in perceived minority groups from receiving the benefits of equal-focus recording. 
See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text. Further research may show that such minority 
suspects are no worse off than they would otherwise be under suspect-focus recording and that 
equal-focus is still a net improvement, but a solution that differentially benefits defendants by 
race does, at the very least, introduce some of the philosophical problems that dispositional 
biases often do.  
 197. Jeremy Stahl, New Body Cam Videos Show Cops Coalescing Around False Narrative 
of Sam DuBose Killing, SLATE (July 30, 2015, 8:54 PM), http://www.slate 
.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/07/30/sam_dubose_murder_phillip_kidd_and_david_lindensch
midt_suspended_after_backing.html [https://perma.cc/AL6N-3BC7] (last updated July 31, 
2015, 5:00 PM) (explaining that slow-motion video showed that Officer Tensing was not 
actually dragged by DuBose’s car; the action which Tensing had claimed justified the panicked 
reaction to shoot DuBose).  
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probative value and unfair prejudice.198 In time, and with strong enough evidence, 
the codification of some of these heuristics may be justified.199 For states, the judicial 
promulgation of evidence rules may also be a more politically feasible way of 
instituting such changes, particularly for those rules which are counterintuitive or 
polarizing.200 
But while research can help judges exercise their discretion in excluding biased 
video evidence, the responsibility for doing so must rest with the judges themselves. 
As others have argued, video evidence fails to receive enough judicial scrutiny, in 
large part because of the misperception (or legal fiction) that video is an objective 
and reliable medium depicting reality.201 Contributing to the lack of scrutiny video 
evidence receives is the incoherent doctrinal basis under which video evidence is 
admitted, which has received criticism for subjecting certain kinds of video to more 
scrutiny than others without a coherent reason for doing so.202 Today, most video 
                                                                                                                 
 
 198. Given the research about the slow-motion intentionality bias, however, slow motion 
may actually create a special risk of legally unfair prejudice in police use-of-force cases. If 
slow-motion playback gave viewers the impression that the officer had more time to think and 
react than they actually did, this could be problematic given that the amount of time the officer 
had to react is an important factor in assessing the reasonableness of police use of force. See 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989); see also Stahl, supra note 197 (interviewing 
an Ohio police officer defending Tensing: “People who watch an encounter on video using the 
slow motion setting to determine what happened have a luxury that police on the street don’t. 
. . . We make split second decisions. Some are right, some are wrong. but [sic] all of our 
decisions are made with an eye toward protecting the public and ourselves.”). Tensing’s was 
likely a special case because there was a specific question of fact that slow motion might show, 
and that fact (whether he was dragged) was extremely probative under the circumstances. 
 199. Perhaps, with enough additional studies confirming the generalizability of the 
prejudicial effects resulting from slow-motion video, it may be appropriate to consider the 
adoption of a rebuttable presumption against its use, waivable either by stipulation of both 
parties or only the defendant. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 410. 
 200. See, e.g., Order Amending Rules of Evidence, No. 94S00-0901-MS-4, 2009 BL 
223000, at *12–17 (Ind. Sept. 15, 2009), https://www.in.gov/ilea/files/Evidence_Rule 
_617.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V8D-8DFD] (adopting Indiana Rule 617, which excludes 
evidence of custodial interrogations which were not fully recorded (subject to several 
exceptions), and noting that several other states had established similar rules through 
legislation, court decisions, or evidence rules). Some may resist the adoption of such rules as 
manifesting an unwarranted distrust of police. See id. at *17 (Shepard, C.J., dissenting).  
 201. See Benforado, supra note 6, at 1371 (describing the “key danger with respect to the 
videotape: it lets judges and jurors off the hook”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: 
Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1998); Andrea 
Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1977–78, 2006 (2017) (categorizing video and 
photographic evidence as types of credibility-dependent “machine testimony” subject to 
“black box dangers”—hidden errors or ambiguities causing fact finders to draw erroneous 
conclusions); Jessica M. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 
37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 507–08 (2004) (referring to confessions and other “actual 
crime” videos as “evidence verité”: a category of evidence misperceived as “unmediated and 
unselfconscious film footage of actual events,” and portrayed by courts as “per se credible and 
evenhanded”).  
 202. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 201, at 2014; Silbey, supra note 201, at 496, 521–22, 556 
n.250.  
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from surveillance and other unmanned cameras is admitted under the “silent witness 
theory,” according to which the video, once authenticated, “speaks for itself” and is 
considered substantive evidence not dependent on the credibility of its maker.203 
Apart from videos that contain graphic or emotionally charged content,204 the content 
of video evidence is generally scrutinized only on grounds that can be traced to 
deliberate manipulation.205  
A similar lack of scrutiny can be seen in decisions regarding the use of video 
evidence by juries during deliberations. Under the theory that a jury might place 
“undue emphasis” on some testimony over others, several jurisdictions have found 
reversible error where certain kinds of “testimonial” video are sent into the jury room 
for unsupervised viewing during deliberations.206 Other jurisdictions have adopted 
rules requiring all “testimonial” video viewed during deliberations to be done in open 
court under supervision.207 Exactly what kinds of video count as “testimonial” varies 
by jurisdiction; the category sometimes includes pretrial statements and depositions, 
while custodial confessions—despite being “obviously testimonial in nature”—are 
generally exempt from mandated supervision and are allowed into the jury room 
during deliberations.208 This exception209 is most often justified under the theory that 
the “centrality” of confessions “warrants whatever emphasis” jurors may put upon 
them.210 Videos depicting arrests, or crimes in progress, are similarly considered to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 203. See Roth, supra note 201, at 2009; Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. 
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 17, 25 (2008).  
 204. See Silbey, supra note 201, at 496 (noting that the most common form of judicial 
scrutiny for filmic evidence is a weighing of unfair prejudice of emotional or graphic content 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403). 
 205. See Silbey, supra note 201, at 520–21 (noting that “day-in-the-life” films in civil cases 
will sometimes be held inadmissible as “evincing too much ‘showmanship’”). 
 206. Many of these cases involve recorded statements of children alleging sexual assault. 
See, e.g., United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 600–01 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that 
the recorded statement of a child accusing the defendant of sexual molestation was “the 
functional equivalent” of live witness testimony, and sending it in to the jury room during 
deliberations was an abuse of discretion), rev’d in part on other grounds, United States v. 
Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1035 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997); People v. Jefferson, 393 P.3d 493, 502 
(Colo. 2017).  
 207. See State v. Gould, 695 A.2d 1022, 1031 (Conn. 1997); Young v. State, 645 So. 2d 
965, 96 (Fla. 1994); State v. Burr, 948 A.2d 627, 636 (N.J. 2008); State v. Koontz, 41 P.3d 
475, 479 (Wash. 2002); Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269, 1276–77 (Wyo. 1986). 
 208. McAtee v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 608, 624 & n.11 (Ky. 2013) (collecting 
authority and noting that the majority of states permit recorded confessions to go into the jury 
room despite being “obviously testimonial in nature”); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 220 
(Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th ed. 2014) (noting also that confessions are “obviously 
testimonial”). 
 209. Some courts actually do not consider this an exception at all, but rather consider 
recorded confessions to be “tangible exhibits” and “non-testimonial in character.” E.g., State 
v. Monroe, 766 A.2d 734, 736 (N.H. 2001) (emphasis omitted). 
 210. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 220, supra note 208; see also People v. Gingles, 350 
P.3d 968, 971 (Colo. App. 2014) (quoting Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 528–29 (Del. 
2006)) (noting that while the concern that jurors might give testimonial exhibits reviewed 
during deliberations undue weight over live witness testimony might arguably apply to 
confessions as well, the “centrality” of confessions to the state’s case justifies their use during 
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be such reliable depictions of what happened that they raise no concerns of undue 
emphasis.211  
Some states subject video depicting testimony, but not video of “actual crimes” 
or confessions, to mandated supervision under the theory that the first, but not the 
other two, can lie.212 This theory overlooks the fact that even if everyone involved 
acted in good faith, any number of completely unintentional effects (such as camera 
angle, the different races of the people in the frame, or angle of lens) and some 
possibly intentional ones (such as the playback speed)213 can shape jurors’ 
perceptions in ways they are themselves unaware.  
Video evidence is here to stay. As more cities build networks of surveillance 
cameras, more confessions are recorded, more police departments adopt body-
camera programs, and more citizens record interactions with police on their 
cellphones, more arrests, alleged crimes, interactions with police, and confessions 
will be recorded. It is difficult to know how much of this video footage finds its way 
into courtrooms—another subject about which there is surprisingly little data.214 
While the availability of video evidence may solve many problems, the prevalence 
of video also creates new problems, and the qualities that make video valuable—its 
stability as compared with human memory, the camera’s neutrality and lack of 
personal interest, and perhaps most of all the amount of information captured—can 
also contribute to a dangerous overreliance on video. 
CONCLUSION: WHERE WE SHOULD BE LOOKING; THE PROMISE OF SITUATIONAL 
BIAS RESEARCH AND THE NEED FOR PRAGMATIC INQUIRY  
This Note started from the premise that energy should be directed toward 
researching what are likely to be problems which need solving, and those which we 
may have the ability to solve. This Conclusion explores in greater detail the factors 
shared by many video evidence biases which make resolution of them both necessary 
and feasible, and seeks to identify what may be some particularly fruitful areas of 
study based on these criteria. 
                                                                                                                 
 
deliberations).  
 211. See, e.g., Springfield v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 589, 593–94 (Ky. 2013) (finding 
that the recording of a drug purchase was a nontestimonial exhibit that could be viewed by the 
jury during deliberations, citing authority from other jurisdictions, and noting the video was a 
“real life replay[] of the central event in question”); see also Windhom v. State, 756 S.E.2d 
296, 298–99 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that surveillance video of a parking lot was 
“independent and original evidence, in and of itself, and does not depend on the credibility of 
the maker for its value. It is a true depiction of the event.” (quoting Matthews v. State, 572 
S.E.2d 719, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002))). 
 212. See, e.g., Springfield, 410 S.W.3d at 593 (contrasting case with unpublished decision 
made the same day in which Supreme Court of Kentucky held that “a video recording of a 
witness’s testimony was testimonial in nature and thus viewing in the jury room was 
impermissible.”); Matthews, 572 S.E.2d at 721–22 (explaining that Georgia’s “continuing 
witness rule” prohibits taking recordings of trial testimony into the jury room but does not 
apply to videos of ongoing crimes.).  
 213. See supra note 156 (discussing the potential for tactical exploitation of slow motion).  
 214. See, e.g., Granot et al., supra note 102, at 94 (noting the lack of available statistics 
about the use of video evidence in trials).  
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To constitute a criminal-justice problem, a bias must not only affect people’s 
perceptions or interpretations of evidence in a predictable fashion, this effect must 
compromise some aim of the criminal justice system. While some categories of 
bias—racial discrimination may be the best example—are clearly impermissible 
because they conflict with constitutional principles,215 other biases raise difficult 
normative questions about what the aims of our criminal justice system should be 
and how it should work.  
For example, it is easy enough to say that a conscious, unapologetic racist with a 
belief that race should drive punishment decisions should be categorically excluded 
from jury service.216 Nor is it much harder to say that steps should be taken to 
mitigate the influence of implicit racial biases which can work the same unfairly 
prejudicial effects, even if the intent is absent.217 But another matter are beliefs which 
might be prejudicial to defendants but which are associated with mainstream cultural 
or political ideologies. If research shows, for example, that a predisposition to trust 
police is worse for defendants, but that such a trust is also correlated with political 
conservatism, at what point do techniques designed to mitigate the influence of such 
an attitude stop being a judicious attempt to ensure juror impartiality and start to 
undermine the principles of democratic representation inherent in the jury system?218 
And, more pragmatically, at what point will a proposed solution be perceived as the 
latter even when it is intended as the former? 
Another problem with combating many dispositional biases is that even if a large 
majority of academics could come to an agreement that the bias represents a problem 
in need of attention, the politically-charged subject matter of these biases may 
frustrate the adoption of solutions anyway. Efforts to combat biases resulting from 
or associated with identification with police may face particular challenges, because 
such efforts may be thought to manifest a distrust or lack of support for police, police 
                                                                                                                 
 
 215. See supra note 35.  
 216. Although, actually proving and excluding a juror for cause on the grounds of racial 
animus is easier said than done. See, e.g., Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and 
Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 845–47 (2012) (surveying the 
limited circumstances in which Supreme Court precedent requires questioning of potential 
jurors about racial prejudice and academic criticism about the ineffectiveness of these 
requirements). 
 217. Although agreeing what steps should be taken may be considerably more difficult. 
See id. at 848–875 (containing detailed examination of various proposals for using the Implicit 
Associational Test as a device to screen out or educate jurors with implicit racial biases, and 
the various challenges each proposal would face). There is also some skepticism about how 
much courts should try to address implicit racial bias. See Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. 
Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1116 
(2006) (“The concept of implicit prejudice straddles the is-ought boundary that has 
traditionally separated facts from values: descriptive scientific claims about how people think 
from normative moral-political claims about how people should think.”); Amy L. 
Wax, Discrimination As Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1130 (1999). 
 218. See Kahan et al., supra note 11, at 895 n.169 (noting that while proposing “debiasing” 
strategies to reduce the influence of cultural factors on the perception of videos with politically 
charged subject matter, the authors wished to make clear that “cultural cognition can be either 
a faculty of moral perception or a cognitive bias depending on whether its effect on judgment 
promotes or frustrates ends that are morally appropriate to the settings and roles we inhabit.”).  
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and prosecutors exert considerable lobbying power with state legislatures,219 and 
many judges, especially elected ones, “may have a direct professional investment in 
appearing tough on crime.”220 
Many of the biases examined in Part I are comparatively apolitical and do not 
implicate the same kinds of philosophical debates.221 But while perhaps somewhat 
less interesting for this reason, research about biases in less politically sensitive 
domains may be more capable of revealing problems that can be solved. To the extent 
that biases can be shown to compromise the popular aims of avoiding arbitrary 
punishment and producing accurate verdicts,222 the desirability of managing them 
should be comparatively uncontroversial.  
In this regard, special emphasis is owed to biases which have been shown to 
produce objectively inaccurate assessments or perceptions of legally relevant fact. 
There are studies that, if representative of real-world conditions, show that the 
camera perspective bias falls into this category.223 Another category worthy of 
consideration is the “lottery” bias, which seems improper because it suggests the 
significant influence of a seemingly random factor.224 This category would include 
the slow-motion intentionality effect,225 racial salience,226 and at least some instances 
of the “attention divides” effect.227 While the bias resulting from such “lottery” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
529 (2001) (noting the power of police and prosecutors in lobbying for changes in substantive 
criminal law); cf. Karena Rahall, The Green to Blue Pipeline: Defense Contractors and the 
Police Industrial Complex, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1785, 1805–06 (2015) (noting that law 
enforcement organizations and police are lobbied by defense contractors and in turn exert 
considerable power in lobbying legislatures for the appropriations for military weapons and 
equipment). 
 220. Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1995, 2053 (2017) (noting also that “given the demographics of the judiciary, whose members 
often originate as prosecutors, many judges may be inclined to expand police authority and 
embrace officer testimony”). 
 221. There are exceptions of course. For example, whether and when it is justified for 
jurors to make adverse inferences from the absence of video when an officer was equipped 
with a BWC but failed to record is a question about which people can reasonably disagree. 
See supra notes 137–40 and accompanying text. Further, one’s opinion about this issue, like 
the question of whether to mandate recording of custodial confessions, may have much to do 
with one’s opinion about the trustworthiness of police. See supra note 202. 
 222. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 78–86 (discussing evidence showing that suspect-focus camera 
perspective reduces the objective accuracy of viewer’s perceptions that confessions were 
correct).  
 224. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 225. See supra Section I.E. 
 226. As the racial salience effect—wherein harsher judgments attend to confessing 
defendants of racial minorities when the interrogating detective is of a different race—has 
been explained as a function of selective attention resulting from visual contrast more than 
implicit racial bias, see supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text, it seems to represent a 
lottery insofar as it punishes minority defendants who happen to be interviewed by white 
officers.  
 227. See Granot et al., supra note 101 (describing the “green” team study, in which a sense 
of identification with randomly assigned groups affected punishment decisions when viewers 
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effects is not necessarily unfair, as the effect may only seem random,228 when a factor 
lacking any explainable, rational connection with a defendant’s guilt has a significant 
influence on factfinders’ judgments of guilt, that should be troubling.229  
Efforts to address biases rooted in situational factors may also face less 
psychological resistance than efforts to address ones rooted in dispositional traits. 
The fact that some situational biases (such as the camera perspective bias) seem to 
result from a failure of perception, rather than reason, and seem to affect people 
almost universally, regardless of disposition, culture, education, and the like,230 may 
mean that a juror (or judge) told that they are influenced by such a bias would be less 
prone to react defensively than someone told that their particular mode of reasoning 
is flawed, or that they are unusually susceptible to judge people based on race or 
gender.231  
Of course, efforts to address situational biases present their own practical 
problems. For example, what was once the proposed solution for the camera 
perspective bias, equal focus video, may create or exacerbate racial salience 
effects.232 The camera perspective bias also presents another practical challenge in 
that its effects on the accuracy of viewers’ assessments of the genuineness of a 
confession may result from the content of video (i.e., the facial expressions and non-
verbal communication of the confessor).233 Perhaps owing to their institutional 
reliance on demeanor evidence, courts have mostly not responded favorably to the 
considerable body of psychological research about its limitations as a means of 
deception detection,234 so to the extent that efforts to curb the camera perspective 
                                                                                                                 
 
were prompted to visually attend to out group members).  
 228. For example, sometimes slow-motion video may increase perceptions of intent 
because facts probative of intent are readily perceivable only in slow motion. See supra notes 
156–159 and accompanying text.  
 229. Here racial salience may be the best example—it would be hard to imagine how an 
investigating officer and a confessing defendant being different races would ever be diagnostic 
as to whether the confession was genuine. 
 230. See supra notes 55–62. 
 231. Cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of 
Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1966 (2009) 
(discussing research suggesting that accusations of racial or gender bias can be seen to 
“impugn a person’s sense of integrity” and generate feelings of anger and shame which will 
make some people react defensively and dismiss the accuser as being a “complainer” or 
“hypersensitive”); Roberts, supra note 216, at 856 (citing Bartlett, supra, at 1966) (noting this 
research and warning that programs seeking to screen jurors with the Implicit Associational 
Test could backfire because some jurors may resent being questioned about their racial 
attitudes and view the party who requested the screening as “playing the race card”).  
 232. See supra Section I.B. 
 233. See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What 
Every Judge and Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 
64 AM. U. L. REV. 1331, 1345–52 (2015) (noting that “few legal principles in contemporary 
American jurisprudence are more entrenched than the notion that demeanor evidence is 
important in deciding witness credibility,” and that demeanor evidence is a main justification 
of the right of Confrontation); Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 
VAND. L. REV. 143, 174–80 (2011) (summarizing research on limited usefulness of demeanor 
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bias require limiting the influence of demeanor evidence, such efforts may face 
resistance.  
But research about the influence of situational factors on the quality and 
perception of video evidence still has the potential of answering questions of 
practical importance for jurists, prosecutors, and defense attorneys conducting 
criminal trials, and for law enforcement organizations and municipalities adopting 
and deploying video technology.  
Taking the latter point first, one issue that I would suggest needs attention by 
researchers is the question of framerate. As more law enforcement organizations 
equip their officers with BWCs,235 and as more municipalities install video 
surveillance systems,236 one of the major financial considerations that will affect the 
decisions about whether to acquire cameras237 and what should be recorded238 is the 
continuous cost of storing all the digital video captured. Decisions about recording 
format—including resolution and framerate—can have significant implications for 
the cost of video storage239 but also, potentially, for the quality of the evidence 
produced.  
                                                                                                                 
 
evidence in deceit detection, and the potential that “visual cues might amount to a red herring 
that distracts observers from concentrating on more diagnostic information embedded in the 
content of the statements and the para-verbal cues emitted by the speaker.”). The belief in the 
value of demeanor evidence is also a principle justification for appellate courts deferring to 
finders of fact where matters of credibility are concerned. See Bennett, supra, at 1350; Simon, 
supra, at 174. Appellate courts may understandably be concerned about the flood of litigation 
which could be created if a principle justification for deference was undermined.  
 235. See supra notes 18–19. 
 236. See supra note 20. 
 237. See HYLAND, supra note 18, at 8–9 (noting that a third of surveyed police forces which 
adopted BWCs reported greater than expected storage costs, and that over three-quarters of 
the surveyed police forces which did not adopt BWCs cited video storage and disposal costs 
as a reason for not doing so.). Storage costs are also a reason why many police forces which 
have acquired BWCs have not fully deployed them. See id. at 4–5, 14 app. tbl.1 (noting that 
twenty percent of surveyed agencies only partially deployed their BWCs, and that insufficient 
funding and technology challenges, including lack of data storage, were the leading reasons 
given for not fully using the acquired BWCs). 
 238. To manage storage costs, agencies may also have a financial incentive to limit the 
events that officers record so as to avoid capturing unnecessary video. Cf. id. at 6 tbl.6 (noting 
that 84% of agencies with BWCs had written policies governing what events to record, of 
these 93% requiring that traffic stops be recorded while only around half required that the 
transportation of offenders be recorded). However, where a recording policy calls for officers 
to frequently toggle recording on and off, there is always the risk that an officer may forget to 
record an event or may not have the time to press record before a sudden event begins. In such 
cases law enforcement may face a different sort of cost, given that a jury which knows that the 
officer had an unused camera may be less likely to credit the officer’s testimony about, for 
example, a suspect’s unrecorded confession, than if the officer never had a BWC at all. See 
supra Section I.D.  
 239. In general terms, increasing the resolution, or size of each individual frame, or the 
number of frames captured per second will each increase the size of the resulting video file. 
See NAT’L INST. JUST., supra note 176 (showing estimated digital sizes of captured video in 
different resolutions).  
2019] THE NOISY “SILENT WITNESS”  1687 
 
In the case of framerate specifically, some assume that BWCs should not record 
in framerates lower than those typically used for television (25–30 frames per second 
(fps)),240 and it seems that most BWCs are at least capable of recording at this 
speed.241 By contrast, surveillance cameras commonly record at lower framerates 
(such as 10fps).242 Some research by those in the surveillance industry shows that 
increased framerate is subject to diminishing marginal returns, with lower framerates 
capturing almost as much relevant information (at least for surveillance purposes) as 
“normal” framerates but at significantly less cost.243 While a choppy, low framerate 
video may be less aesthetically pleasing than one recorded at “normal” speed, it does 
not necessarily contain less probative evidence about the underlying events.244  
Some might object that even if a video at “normal” framerate does not contain 
any discrete, identifiable facts that a lower frame rate video does not, a video is less 
“lifelike” and immersive—and possibly less persuasive to a jury—when it looks 
more like a series of still images played in quick succession than an actual event seen 
                                                                                                                 
 
 240. Id. (suggesting that framerates lower than 25 FPS “suffer from increased motion blur” 
and should be avoided for BWCs.).  
 241. A study of the design characteristics of sixty-six models of BWC on the market 
showed that most offered recording speeds of at least 30fps, with several offering higher 
framerates like 60 or 120fps. See VIVIAN HUNG, STEVEN BABIN & JACQUELINE COBERLY, 
NAT’L INST. JUST., A MARKET SURVEY ON BODY WORN CAMERA TECHNOLOGIES, at 4–17 to 4–
26 tbl.2 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250381.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J3KW-MSE3]. Although a few models were listed as having a default 
framerate of 30fps and being capable of recording at higher speeds, see id. at 5–159, it was 
unclear from this survey how many of the models examined were capable of recording at 
framerates lower than 30fps. 
 242. John Honovich, Frame Rate Guide for Video Surveillance, IPVM (Aug. 7, 2014), 
https://ipvm.com/reports/frame-rate-surveillance-guide [https://perma.cc/C6SF-MBVZ] 
(estimating the industry average at around 10fps).  
 243. Id. (comparing the amount of movement which was discernable across surveillance 
videos of the same events recorded at 1, 10, and 30fps, concluding that “going from 10fps to 
30fps can double the storage costs but only marginally improve details captured”). In one vivid 
illustration of such diminishing marginal returns, one can see three videos of a man walking 
down a hallway while turning his head from side to side: “at 1fps only a single clear head shot 
is captured, but at 10fps you get many more. Finally at 30fps, you may get one or two more, 
but it is not much of an improvement.” The author also noted that a camera designed and 
properly configured for low framerate recording will not produce motion blur. Id. (“Frame 
rate does not cause blurring. This is a misconception. The camera’s automatic speed shutter 
control does.”). 
 244. Granted, BWCs sometimes capture altercations between civilians and officers where 
there is frenetic movement, see, e.g., Williams et al., supra note 107 (showing several scripted 
videos of such encounters), and in theory some very fast movements in such an encounter 
could be imperceptible at lower framerates, but it is unclear how often such information would 
be important to deciding a case. It is even possible that such quick, fleeting movements are 
more often random noise that says nothing meaningful about a suspect’s guilt or innocence, 
and which, if scrutinized by a jury (perhaps repeatedly, perhaps in slow motion) will do more 
harm than good. Cf. TALEB, supra note 1, at 126–27 (noting that checking stock prices on a 
more frequent basis can lead to worse financial decisions because daily updates often reflect 
random market fluctuations (noise), which tend to cancel out in the long run and say less about 
the actual value of an investment than long term trends). 
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first-hand. There are two responses to this. First, given that storage costs may lead to 
recording policies that result in some encounters going unrecorded,245 choppy video 
may be preferable to no video at all. Second, and more importantly, video is a series 
of still images played in quick succession. This is no less true when we double the 
number of images and show each of them for half as long. Whatever persuasiveness 
video loses when it is made to look more like what it actually is it arguably never 
deserved in the first place. And, given the research suggesting that people tend to 
“overbelieve” video and place more weight in it than it deserves,246 a visual reminder 
that what one is watching is only a series of pictures, taken by a camera that may or 
may not have been pointed in the direction of anything relevant and which, like any 
other evidence, can be confusing, misleading, and open to multiple interpretations, 
may actually help. 
Obviously, research could show otherwise. A choppier, jerkier video may be more 
prone to the “deceptive intensity” that Professor Stoughton observed.247 If framerate 
was low enough, jurors could speculate about what might have happened between 
frames, and the perceived ambiguities thus injected into the video could create fodder 
for each juror’s own prejudices and motivated reasoning to influence their 
perceptions or conclusions.248 But even if higher framerates generally reduced the 
tendency for biased perception of video and the optimal framerate psychologically is 
higher than 30fps, that would be useful information too.  
Either way, it seems somewhat unlikely that the optimal framerate—which 
balances the risk of missing information between frames at the low end and the risk 
of wasting public resources and capturing extraneous information (noise) at the high 
end—would just happen to be the one we use for television. Given the potential cost 
savings which might be realized through lower framerate recording, empirical 
research about precisely how framerate affects the evidentiary and psychological 
quality of video can help municipalities and police forces make more informed 
decisions about how to best use public resources.249  
Finally, research about situational factors that influence the perception of video 
evidence can have practical significance for legal practitioners who conduct criminal 
trials. While this Note describes some video evidence biases, like slow motion, as 
“lotteries” (in that they represent the influence of random or situational factors), to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 245. See supra note 240. 
 246. See Granot et al., supra note 102, at 96–98. 
 247. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 248. Cf. Sommers, supra note 9, at 1313, 1349 (summarizing research of motivated 
reasoning literature, which “suggests that, in general, stimuli that are more ambiguous provide 
more room for bias to infuse viewers’ interpretations”).  
 249. Such a study would seem fairly easy to design as well. Given that lower framerate 
video can always be created from higher framerate video by removing frames, any number of 
previous studies could be repeated to see what effects framerate has on the intensity of various 
biases already observed. And if nothing else, because the control group would watch the video 
in its original framerate, this would give researchers the chance to test the reproducibility of 
the original studies, which is important in itself. For a discussion about the need for replication 
studies to validate social science research, see, for example, Jason M. Chin, Psychological 
Science’s Replicability Crisis and What It Means for Science in the Courtroom, 20 PSYCH. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 225 (2014). 
2019] THE NOISY “SILENT WITNESS”  1689 
 
the extent that counsel can predictably exploit these effects through adversarial 
presentation they may be better described as games with an element of skill. 
 While some could argue that the adversarial process manages the risk of bias by 
giving both the prosecution and the defense the chance to employ such tactics, there 
is reason to think the prosecution may enjoy structural advantages which enable it to 
take greater advantage of some presentation effects. For example, while either the 
defense or the prosecution may try to use slow motion, insofar as slow motion 
unfairly suggests that the video subjects behaved intentionally, this will, in the 
normal course, be more helpful for the prosecution, which more often has the burden 
of proving intent.250 It has also been suggested that, because the prosecution always 
presents its case-in-chief first in the United States, the State’s adversarial 
presentation of video (through narration, freeze-framing, and other techniques) may 
bias jurors such that they will continue to interpret the video in a way consistent with 
the State’s presentation, even upon subsequent viewings.251 
But, as noted earlier,252 there is a surprising lack of empirical study about the 
extent to which an initial biased interpretation of video is affected by subsequent 
repeat viewings, with some researchers suggesting that replays might intensify 
bias,253 and others suggesting that a second viewing may be necessary to correct an 
initial biased perception.254 Presumably, either or both could be true in different 
circumstances. However, knowing something about which circumstances tend to 
reinforce or alleviate bias could be helpful in making decisions about, say, whether 
jurors should be allowed to rewatch a video in slow motion if they saw it in slow 
motion during the presentation of evidence.255  
Researchers of video evidence have started noting the need to study the effects of 
adversarial presentation, and the potential efficacy of alternative forms of 
presentation,256 which seems like precisely the right line of inquiry. In closing, I 
                                                                                                                 
 
 250. See supra note 156. 
 251. Granot et al., supra note 102, at 101. Empirical evidence of such a first mover 
advantage would go a long way toward countering the argument that equal access to 
adversarial presentation techniques renders them harmless.  
 252. See supra Section I.F. 
 253. See supra note 163. 
 254. See supra notes 171–72. 
 255. Other related questions might include: (1) should jurors, if allowed to rewatch video 
in slow motion during deliberations be required to also watch it at normal speed, which the 
only study thus far of the slow motion intentionality effect showed had a mitigating influence 
on the bias, see supra note 161 and accompanying text; (2) should jurors who wish to rewatch 
the same few seconds of a video—for example, the moment where an officer’s foot connects 
with a plaintiff’s head—be allowed to do so without watching the preceding and following 
moments for context (cf. Payne v. Myers, No. 14-CV-39-GKF-TLW, 2016 WL 3884169, at 
*6 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2016) (granting plaintiff’s motion to show this so-called “Kick Off” 
video in slow motion, but requiring that jury be shown the entire video rather than “short, 
repetitive clips of the precise moment of contact”)); and (3) what do the answers to the 
preceding questions tell us about the wisdom of allowing jurors to take video with them into 
the jury room to watch unsupervised during deliberations, as some jurisdictions do? See supra 
notes 208–15 and accompanying text.  
 256. See Granot et al., supra note 102, at 101 (suggesting that having a neutral third party 
present video evidence first could potentially neutralize a first mover advantage which might 
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would add only one additional counterargument to the challenge that such efforts 
would undermine the adversarial process.  
Whatever might be said for the adversarial use of video evidence, it is largely 
inconsistent with the judicial attitude (underpinning the doctrines under which video 
evidence is admitted) that video evidence is an objective and reliable representation 
of actual events.257 If one starts from the (erroneous) premise that video represents 
reality itself, then the choice to present video in slow motion should be seen as a 
deliberate distortion of reality.258 Conversely, if one accepts that video may be 
ambiguous, or contain irrelevant and confusing information (noise), or have enough 
room for interpretation that selective presentation or explanation by counsel is 
necessary or helpful for a jury’s proper understanding, then one should also accept 
that video, like other evidence, can be misleading, confusing, and sometimes 
substantially more prejudicial than probative. But the position that video evidence 
represents “what happened” so reliably that it should be admitted without scrutiny 
seems entirely at odds with the idea that a jury needs help to understand it. If video 





                                                                                                                 
 
otherwise accrue to the prosecution).  
 257. See supra notes 204–15.  
 258. See, e.g., Commonwealth. v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1282–83 (Pa. 2016) (Wecht, J., 
concurring) (“[Slow motion playback] may, in a given case, accentuate images and depictions 
that, by their very nature, are so disturbing as to impart unfair prejudice that outweighs the 
video’s probative value. As one Pennsylvania court noted, ‘[i]n a sense, all slow motion and 
freeze frame video distorts reality. It distorts it in the same way that magnification of a 
photograph distorts reality. Such distortion may enhance the jury's understanding or it may do 
the opposite.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Hindi, 631 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1993))). Justice Wecht’s short concurrence in Cash presents an unusually nuanced and 
thoughtful view of the slow-motion issue, although, with the benefit of hindsight and the study 
by Caruso and colleagues, see supra Section I.E, one might add that slow-motion video can 
impart other forms of prejudice apart from emphasizing graphic images.  
